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"USERNAME JACKING" IN SOCIAL MEDIA: SHOULD
CELEBRITIES AND BRAND OWNERS RECOVER
FROM SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES WHEN THEIR
SOCIAL MEDIA USERNAMES ARE STOLEN?
INTRODUCTION
Former vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin posted a status up-
date' on Facebook asking for recipe recommendations for a salmon
that her husband Todd had caught.2 Baseball manager Tony La Russa
tweeted3 that there were no drunk-driving incidents on the St. Louis
Cardinals' latest road trip.4 These, like many other status updates and
tweets, were not really sent by Sarah Palin or Tony La Russa. Impos-
ters had "jacked"5 Palin's and La Russa's social media usernames.
After involving their lawyers, Palin and La Russa were able to recover
their usernames.6 Given the massive growth of social networking 7-
and the high visibility that social media sites achieve on search engine
1. A status update is a message posted by a Facebook user for that user's friends to see.
2. Katherine Rosman, Sarah Palins' Facebook Alter-Ego Gets Found Out, WSJ.cOm
SPEAKEASY BLOG (Aug. 13, 2009, 9:11 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/speakeasy/2009/08/13/sarah-
palins-facebook-alter-ego-gets-found-out/; see also infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
3. A "tweet" is a 140-character message that is sent through Twitter, a micro-blogging social
networking site. TwirrER SUPPORT: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, http://help.twitter.coml
forums/10711/entries/13920 (last visited Jan. 25, 2011). Tweets are distributed to the author's
feed subscribers, known as "followers," and also appear on the author's Twitter homepage. Id.
4. Complaint, La Russa v. Twitter, Inc., No. CGC-09-488101, at Exhibit A (Cal. Super. Ct.
June 5, 2009), available at http://webaccess.sftc.org/scripts/magic94/Mgrqispi94.dll?APPNAME=
IJS&PRGNAME=casenumberprompt22 (enter case number CGC09488101 and follow "View"
hyperlink in last row of chart); see also infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
5. The term "jacked" will be used hereinafter to refer to instances in which an imposter has
stolen or squatted on a celebrity's or brand's social networking site username.
6. See infra notes 69, 80-86 and accompanying text.
7. Social networking site Facebook.com serves over 500 million users and, according to online
analytics provider Hitwise, passed Google in March 2010 as the most visited Web site in the
United States. Mark Zuckerberg, 500 Million Stories, FACEBOOK BLOG (July 21, 2010, 9:23
AM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=409753352130; see also Heather Dougherty,
Facebook Reaches Top Ranking in US, HrrwlSE BLOG (Mar. 15, 2010, 11:24 AM). http://
weblogs.hitwise.com/heather-dougherty/2010/03/facebook-reaches-top-rankingi.html. In Feb-
ruary 2010, Twitter.com saw fifty million tweets per day-600 per second. Kevin Weil, Measur-
ing Tweets, TWITTER BLOG (Feb. 22, 2010, 12:30 PM), http://blog.twitter.com/2010/02/measuring-
tweets.htmL. Linkedln.com, a social networking site primarily used by business professionals,
has fifty million users. Jeff Weiner, LinkedIn: 50 Million Professionals Worldwide, LINKEDIN
BLOG (Oct. 14, 2009), http://blog.linkedin.com/2009/10/14/linkedin-50-million-professionals-
worldwide/. MySpace.com has more than 113 million active users. Fact Sheet, MYSPACE PRESS
Room, http://www.myspace.com/pressroom?url=/fact+sheet/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
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results pages for celebrity and brand name queries 8-social network
usernames have become extremely valuable.9 Thus, cybersquatters,
spammers, impersonators, and celebrity and brand fans have jacked
many high-profile usernames.10
Username-jacking victims who seek a legal remedy can go after the
individuals who jacked their profiles only if they can find them. Many
times, it will be difficult to locate the perpetrator because he regis-
tered the celebrity's or brand's profile using a fake e-mail address or
masked IP address. This-in addition to the social site's likely ability
to pay larger damages than an individual jacker-may lead the jacking
victim to sue the social site itself." This Comment will analyze the
potential claims that a username-jacking victim may bring against a
social site and the likelihood that those claims will succeed.
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (the CDA) offers
social networks limited immunization from many torts of their third-
party users, including defamation and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.12 But § 230(e)(2) states that Web site operators are
not immune from "any law pertaining to intellectual property."13 Part
II of this Comment chronicles the rise of username jacking.14 It then
discusses the potential claims a jacking victim could bring against a
social networking site.15 Thus, Part II sets out the intellectual prop-
erty claims that could apply to username-jacking situations, including
cybersquatting,16 trademark violations,' 7 and right of publicity
violations.18
Part III analyzes whether a username-jacking victim should recover
for any of these intellectual property claims. Part III argues that
cybersquatting laws should not apply to usernames. 19 It then argues
that a jacking victim should recover for a trademark violation only
when users actually believe that the fake profile is the celebrity's or
brand's real profile.20 Part III then cautions against allowing celebri-
ties to recover on right of publicity claims under § 230, an issue over
8. See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 42-64 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 92-108 and accompanying text.
13. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2006).
14. See infra notes 42-64 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 88-188 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 110-19 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 121-51 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 155-88 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 189-335 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 246-91 and accompanying text.
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which federal courts are split.21 Part IV claims that the social sites
have sufficient username dispute resolution processes in place and
that it is a waste of judicial resources for celebrities and brands to sue
for username jacking.22 The ultimate goals of this Comment are to
show the difficulty in succeeding in a username-jacking suit and to
encourage brands and celebrities to work with the social networking
sites to recover jacked usernames.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part describes the value of a social network username, which
has spurred the rise of username jacking.23 It discusses the resolution
of specific username-jacking instances and then outlines the legal
claims a jacking victim could bring against a social networking site.2 4
Section 230 of the CDA does not immunize Web site operators from
intellectual property claims.25 Thus, this Part focuses on intellectual
property claims, including cybersquatting26 and trademark viola-
tions.27 It also discusses the split in authority as to whether § 230 bars
right of publicity claims. 28
A. The Value of Social Media Usernames
Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, and LinkedIn enable people to claim
their usernames in the URLs of their profile pages-for example,
http://twitter.com/TonyLaRussa or http://www.facebook.com/coca
cola. Usernames are called "vanity URLs" or, on Twitter, "han-
dles." 29 In light of the substantial growth of social networking sites,30
it is critical for celebrities and trademark holders to own their social
media usernames. Controlling a username is becoming as valuable as
controlling the brand's or celebrity's native site.31 Usernames are val-
uable because social networking has changed the way in which brands
and celebrities market themselves and how consumers make purchase
21. See infra notes 292-319 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 338-51 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 30-64 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 88-188 and accompanying text.
25. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2006).
26. See infra notes 110-20 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 121-53 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 173-88 and accompanying text.
29. See Ben Parr, Facebook to Launch Vanity URLs for All, MASHABLE (June 9, 2009). http://
mashable.com/2009/06/09/facebook-vanity-urls/; TwiTTER HELP CENTER: THE TWrffER GLOS-
SARY, http://support.twitter.com/entries/166337-the-twitter-glossary#h (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
30. See supra note 7.
31. "Native site" will be used hereinafter to refer to a celebrity's or brand's traditional .com
location; for example www.tonylarussa.com or www.cocacola.com.
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decisions. Consumers want to interact with brands via social network-
ing sites; forty percent of consumers have "friended" a brand on
Facebook. 32 These interactions can lead to direct sales-Dell Com-
puters used its Twitter page to drive two million dollars in sales in the
first half of 2009.33 Social networking sites also give brands the ability
to communicate directly with consumers, solve their problems, and
provide them with information. 34 When a brand's social username is
jacked, someone other than the brand owner controls that brand's
message in the marketplace.
Individuals are likely to come across jacked profiles while searching
for brands and celebrities within social networks and on search en-
gines like Google. Search engines strive to provide searchers with the
most relevant and helpful search results. Social media sites satisfy
consumer needs in unique new ways3 5 and are thus increasingly being
incorporated into search results.36 In determining relevancy, search
engines take into account, among other factors, a page's URL, title,
and content.37 The social media username is included in the profile
page's URL (facebook.com/sarahpalin), title ("Sarah Palin -
Facebook"), and content.38 Thus, search engines often rank
Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace pages highly in brand and celebrity
name search results. For instance, a Google search for "Sarah Palin"
32. Razorfish, FEED: The Razorfish Digital Brand Experience Report 8-9 (2009), available at
http://feed.razorfish.com/downloads/Razorfish FEEDO9.pdf (noting that twenty-six percent of
consumers have followed a brand on Twitter, and seventy-three percent have posted a product
or brand review on sites like Facebook or Twitter); see also Mike Sachoff, Majority of Consumers
Want to Interact with Brands Online, WEBPRONEws (Oct. 20, 2009), http://www.webpronews.
com/topnews/2009/10/20/majority-of-consumers-want-to-interact-with-brands-online.
33. See Claire Cain Miller, Dell Says It Has Earned $3 Million from Twitter, N.Y. TIMEs Brrs
BLOG (June 12, 2009, 8:39 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/12/dell-has-earned-3-
million-from-twitter/.
34. H&R Block uses its Facebook page, facebook.com/hrblock, to interact with consumers by
providing them tax advice. For instance, one user posted,
My wife and I are getting ready to buy a new door to take advantage of the energy tax
credit before the end of the year. I know that there were some changes made this year
that make it harder to get the credit. Are there any changes coming for 2010?
Mark Pannell, Posting to H&R BLOCK FACEBOOK PROFILE (Oct. 13, 2009, 9:17 AM), http://
www.facebook.com/hrblock.
35. Consumer needs include connecting with friends, sharing content, talking about products,
and interacting with brands.
36. Google and Microsoft both reached deals with Twitter in October 2009 to bring real-time
tweets to the search engine results pages (SERPs). See Rich Cherecwich, Twitter Sells Out,
IMEDIACONNECTION (Oct. 22, 2009), http://www.imediaconnection.comcontent/24831.asp.
37. MIKE MORAN & BILL HuNT, SEARCH ENGINE MARKETING, INC.: DRIVING SEARCH TRAF-
FIC TO YOUR COMPANY'S WEB SIrE 298-99 (2d ed. 2009) (outlining search engine ranking
factors).
38. See SARAH PALIN FACEBOOK PROFILE, http://www.facebook.com/sarahpalin (last visited
Jan. 25, 2011).
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shows facebook.com/sarahpalin as the fourth-ranked search result.39
If brands and celebrities do not control their social media pages, they
risk losing control of how they would like their brand portrayed in the
search results.40 A user searching for a brand on Google could easily
come across a social media page that looks like an official brand page
but is actually a gripe page, parody page, or page controlled by that
brand's competitor.41
B. The Rise of Social Network Username Jacking
Jacking is possible because Facebook, Twitter, Linkedln, and MyS-
pace give out usernames on a first-come, first-serve basis.42 For in-
stance, when a user registers for a Twitter account, he can pick any
username as long as that name is not already taken by another user.43
Celebrities and politicians whose names have been jacked on social
networking sites include President Barack Obama,44 comedians
39. GOOGLE, www.google.com (search for "Sarah Palin") (last visited Jan. 25, 2011). Addi-
tionally, a Google search for "William Shatner" shows twitter.com/williamshatner as the fifth-
ranked result. Id. (search for "William Shatner"). A Google search for "Barack Obama" shows
twitter.com/barackobama as the fourth-ranked result. Id. (search for "Barack Obama"). A
Google search for Chicago-based t-shirt retailer "Threadless" shows twitter.com/threadless as
the fourth-ranked result and facebook.com/threadless as the eighth-ranked result. Id. (search
for "Threadless").
40. Erik J. Heels, The Brand Wars Are Coming! How to Defend Your Brands on the Internet,
LAw PRAc., July-Aug. 2007, at 24, 26 (commenting that, because sites like MySpace "are highly
ranked by Google, you could find your brands in highly ranked search results for URLs that are
not under your control").
41. For instance, a Google search for comedian "Stephen Colbert" shows a fake Colbert Twit-
ter page, twitter.com/stephencolbert, as the sixth-ranked search result. GOOGLE, supra note 39
(search for "Stephen Colbert"). To the average Internet searcher, there is no indication that this
page is a fake one-in fact, it has over 386,000 followers as of June 2010. See STEPHEN COLBERT
ON TwlTER, http://twitter.com/stephencolbert (last visited Jan. 25, 2011). Colbert's real Twitter
page is twitter.com/StephenAtHome, which is a "verified account." A verified account carries a
special logo that indicates Twitter has "been in contact with the person or entity the account is
representing and verified that it is approved." Verified Account, TwIrrER, http://twitter.com/
help/verified (last visited Jan. 25, 2011); see also infra note 344 and accompanying text.
42. See Blaise DiPersia, Coming Soon: Facebook Usernames, FACEBOOK BLOG (June 9, 2009,
2:11 PM), http:/iblog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=90316352130 (commenting on the launch of
Facebook vanity URLs and how users will be able to choose a username starting at midnight on
June 13, 2009 on a first-come, first-serve basis); Steve Patrizi, Strengthening Your Professional
Brand Through LinkedIn, LINKEDIN BLOG (Sept. 26, 2007), http:/fblog.linkedin.com/2007/09/26/
post-8/ (encouraging users to claim their vanity URL on Linkedln); see also Erik J. Heels, How
to Twittersquat the Top 100 Brands, ERIK J. HEELS BLOG (Jan. 8, 2009), http://erikjheels.com/
?p=1298.
43. See Create an Account, TwirrER, https://twitter.com/signup (last visited Jan. 25, 2011) (if a
username types a name that is taken in the "username" box, he will be told to "pick a unique
name").
44. Rachel Rosmarin, Obama to MySpace: That's MyPage, FORBES.COM (May 2, 2007, 5:15
PM), http://www.forbes.com/2007/05/02/myspace-election-obama-tech-cx rr_0502obama.html.
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Whoopi Goldberg45 and Tina Fey,46 actor Christopher Walken,47 for-
mer Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice,48 Microsoft founder Bill
Gates,49 reporter Geraldo Rivera,50 deceased rapper The Notorious
B.I.G.,51 NFL players Peyton Manning 52 and Ben Roethlisberger, 53
rapper Kanye West, 54 and actor Gary Busey.55
In June 2009, the Facebook username "Governor Palin" was jacked
by a former film executive doing a research experiment. 56 The jacker
uploaded a picture and started posting earnest status updates; some
users believed the updates were from the real Sarah Palin.57 The pro-
file gained 600 friends.58 Fake Palin's status updates later became
more satirical and then outright offensive.59 Facebook shut down the
profile after two months.60
The most publicized case of username jacking involved the manager
of the St. Louis Cardinals, Tony La Russa. The @TonyLaRussa Twit-
ter handle was jacked in April 2009 and used to falsely portray La
45. Noah Mallin, Social Media: Twitter, Bit.1y and Whoopi Start to Channel the Data Flow,
SEARCHVIEWs BLOG (May 6, 2009, 4:43 PM), http://www.searchviews.com/index.php/archives/
2009/05/social-media-twitter-bitly-and-whoopi-start-to-channel-the-data-flow.php (describing
Whoopi Goldberg giving Twitter founders Evan Williams and Biz Stone an earful on The View
because an impersonator was using Goldberg's handle).
46. Joshua Rhett Miller, 'Twitterjacking'- Identity Theft in 140 Characters or Less, FoxNEWS.






52. Not Real, Colts Fans, CoLTs NEWS, http://www.colts.com/sub.cfm?page=article7&news
id=86bf675b-52a6-4ec8-86cb-e630ealbba22 (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
53. Jimmy Golen, Experts Say La Russa's Twitter Suit Was a Long Shot, COLUMBIA MISSOU-
RIAN ONLINE (June 7, 2009, 8:26 PM), http://www.columbiamissourian.com/stories/2009/06/07/
experts-say-la-russas-twitter-suit-was-long-shot/ (commenting that fake Ben Roethlisberger in-
correctly told his Twitter followers that Ben Roethlisberger had skin cancer).
54. Julia Angwin, Who Owns Your Name on Twitter?, Wsi.com (May 19, 2009), http://online.
wsj.comlarticle/SB124269417597532869.html.
55. Id.; see also infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
56. Rosman, supra note 2.
57. Most updates were about God and America, including, "Happy 4th of July and God
Bless!?!" Id.
58. Id.
59. Updates ranged from the reasonably believable-"I need a salmon recipe for tonight.
Todd just brought home a fresh one. Something spicy!" (eliciting dozens of recipe responses
from her friends)-to the offensive: "GOD LOVES US ALL, no matter how black or African,
or even gay or Jewish we are." Id.
60. Id.
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Russa.61 The profile, unlike the one for fake Governor Palin, was ob-
viously a parody from day one.6 2
Brands are also not immune to username jacking. In January 2009,
a person within the Michigan-based public relations firm Marx Layne
jacked the Twitter handle of a rival firm, Tanner Friedman, and
started distributing malicious tweets.63 Tanner Freidman is not alone;
one legal commentator found that at the start of 2009, ninety-three of
the top 100 global brands had been "Twitterjacked." 64
C. Reclaiming a Social Network Username
Social networking sites prohibit the selling of usernames and re-
serve the right to reclaim names when they deem appropriate. 65
61. Tweets by the fake La Russa referenced the 2007 drunk-driving death of Cardinals'
pitcher Josh Hancock, as well as La Russa's own 2007 driving under the influence charge. These
tweets included, "Lost 2 out of 3, but we made it out of Chicago without one drunk driving
incident or dead pitcher" and "drinking a cold Zima and wishing fucking Hancock was alive, I
bet he could've gotten [opponent] Jack Wilson out." Complaint, La Russa v. Twitter, Inc., No.
CGC-09-488101, at Exhibit A (Cal. Super. Ct. May 6, 2009). The La Russa profile had only four
followers. Id.; see also Tony La Russa Sues Twitter over Alleged Fake Page, PRESS OF ATLANTIC
CIrY, June 4, 2009, at B3.
62. Fake La Russa wrote in his bio, "Parodies are fun for everyone." Complaint, LaRussa, at
Exhibit A.
63. Andrew Moshirnia, Brandjacking on Social Networks: Twitter, Malicious Ghost Writing,
and Corporate Sabotage, CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJEcr (July 15, 2009), http://www.citmedialaw.
org/blog/2009/brandjacking-social-networks-twitter-malicious-ghost-writing-and-corporate-sabo-
tage (commenting that Tanner Friedman learned that the @TannerFriedman handle was created
by someone within rival firm Marx Layne after Twitter provided the firm, by court order, with
the IP address associated with the creation of the account).
64. Heels, supra note 42. BP was another corporate Twitter-jacking victim during the 2010
Gulf of Mexico oil spill. See Ki Mae Heussner, Fake BP Twitter Account Mocks Oil Spill PR
Efforts, ABC NEWS (May 25, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/fake-bp-twitter-account-
mocks-oil-spill-pr/story?id=10737669. The fake BP profile was used to parody BP's response to
the oil spill and has gained more than 190,000 followers as of September 2010. BP PUBLIC RELA-
TIONS ON TWIrrER, http://twitter.com/BPGlobalPR (last visited Jan. 25, 2011). Exxon Mobil was
also Twitter jacked. A woman posing as an Exxon employee created the profile twitter.com/
ExxonMobilCorp and began responding to questions about the company's direction. See Jer-
emiah Owyang, How "Janet" Fooled the Twittersphere (and Me) She's the Voice of Exxon Mobil,
WEB STRATEGIST BLOG (Aug. 1, 2008), http://www.web-strategist.com/blog/2008/08/01/how-
janet-fooled-the-twittersphere-shes-the-voice-of-exxon-mobill.
65. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/terms.php
(last visited Jan. 25, 2011) ("You will not transfer your account ... to anyone without ... our
written permission.. . . [Wie reserve the right to remove or reclaim it if we believe appropriate
(such as when a trademark owner complains about a username that does not closely relate to a
user's actual name)."); User Agreement, LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/static?key=
useragreement (last visited Jan. 25, 2011) ("You agree to ... refrain from selling, trading, or
otherwise transferring your LinkedIn account to another party . . . ."); Terms & Conditions,
MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=misc.terms (last visited Jan. 25, 2011)
(stating that "selling or otherwise transferring your profile" is prohibited and that MySpace can
"terminate your access ... at any time, for any or no reason"); The Twitter Rules, TWITTER
SUPPORT, http://help.twitter.com/forums/26257/entries/18311 (last visited Jan. 25, 2011) ("We re-
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Many celebrities and brands have been able to reclaim their
usernames without legal action. For example, President Barack
Obama reclaimed myspace.com/barackobama in 2007.66 MySpace
turned the page over to the Obama campaign at its request, comment-
ing that Obama "'had the right to the URL containing his name and
to the official campaign content that was provided." 67 Twitter re-
claimed singer Kanye West's handle after he publically complained
that he was being impersonated and questioned the authenticity of
other celebrity Twitter accounts. 68 Sarah Palin's fake Facebook pro-
file was removed after her attorney contacted Facebook. 69
Brands often have to be careful when attempting to reclaim their
usernames in instances in which a fan, called an "influencer,"70 cre-
ated the social media page. A brand does not want to offend its big-
gest fans. Coca-Cola faced this situation when two influencers created
a Coke Facebook fan page that became the second most popular page
on Facebook by November 2008.71 Coke could have taken back the
page using the Facebook rule mandating that only those authorized by
a brand can create a page for that brand.72 Instead, it partnered with
the influencers, flew them to its headquarters, and discussed strategies
for jointly leveraging the page.73
Others have not succeeded in reclaiming their usernames. Senator
John McCain attempted to recover his LinkedIn vanity URL during
the 2008 presidential race.74 LinkedIn refused because the URL was
serve the right to reclaim user names on behalf of businesses or individuals that hold legal claim
or trademark on those user names. .. . [Y]ou agree that you will not reproduce, duplicate, copy,
sell, trade or resell the Services for any purpose.
66. Rosmarin, supra note 44.
67. Id. (quoting MySpace executive Jeff Berman).
68. See generally Angwin, supra note 54.
69. Rosman, supra note 2 (quoting Palin's spokeswoman as saying Facebook's legal counsel
"worked quickly to resolve the situation and was very responsive").
70. An influencer is a brand's customer who takes it upon himself to promote the brand,
usually via word-of-mouth on a social site. See CHARLENE Li & JOSH BERNOFF, GROUNDSWELL:
WINNING IN A WORLD TRANSFORMED BY SOCIAL TECHNOLOGIES 94 (2008).
71. See Abbey Klaassen, How Two Coke Fans Brought the Brand to Facebook Fame, ADVER-
TISING AGE (Mar. 16, 2009), http://adage.com/digitallarticlearticleid=135238.
72. Create a Page, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/pages/create.php (last visited Jan. 25,
2011) (stating that by clicking "Create Official Page," the user agrees that he is "the official
representative of this person, business, band or product and [has] permission to create this
Page").
73. Klaassen, supra note 71. CNN faced a similar situation when a fan created twitter.com/
CNNbrk as a CNN breaking news feed and the site gained a massive following. Angwin, supra
note 54. CNN was reluctant to take aggressive measures against a fan evangelizing its brand. Id.
CNN arranged for the fan to train its staff on how to use Twitter in return for the fan transferring
ownership of the account. Id. Twitter.com/CNNbrk has over three million followers as of June
2010. See CNN BREAKING NEWS ON TWITTER, twitter.com/CNNbrk (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
74. Angwin, supra note 54.
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validly taken by another individual named John McCain. 75 Actor
Gary Busey stopped trying to reclaim fake Gary Busey MySpace
pages, including www.myspace.com/garybusey, which "portrays Mr.
Busey as a hash-smoking cougar killer."76 Busey claimed he did not
have the resources to fight the fake profiles that kept appearing.77
Some disputes have resulted in legal action. In the Tanner Fried-
man corporate sabotage situation, Tanner filed suit to compel Twitter
to provide the IP address of the user who registered the handle.78
Tanner did not sue Twitter, but it did sue the John Doe who created
the account on the grounds of cyberpiracy, defamation, intentional in-
terference with contractual and business relations, trademark infringe-
ment, and unfair competition. 79
In other cases, victims have opted to sue the social networking site
because the site has more resources to pay damages than the individ-
ual who jacked the username. The victim may also sue the social net-
work rather than the individual perpetrator because it is often difficult
to identify the perpetrator; for example, the account may have been
registered from an IP address that was masked or associated with
many users, such as the address of a university, library, or corpora-
tion.s0 Tony La Russa opted to sue Twitter in California state court81
after trying to contact Twitter for a week to have his fake profile
deleted. 82 La Russa sued Twitter for trademark infringement, false
designation of origin, trademark dilution, cybersquatting, misappro-
priation of name, misappropriation of likeness, invasion of privacy,
and intentional misrepresentation. 8 3 Twitter deleted the profile within
75. Id. (citing LinkedIn spokeswoman Kay Luo).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Jason Chupick, Detroit Agency Catches Twitter Imposter, PRNEWSWER (June 25, 2009, 9:49
AM), http://www.mediabistro.com/prnewser/agencies/detroit-agency-catches-twitterimposter.
119957.asp; Don Tanner, A Final(?) Word on Twittergate, TANNER FRIEDMAN BLOG (June 25,
2009, 1:21 PM), http://www.tannerfriedman.com/blog/?p=303; see also Guidelines for Law En-
forcement, TwriER SUPPORT, http://twitter.zendesk.com/forums/26257/entries/41949 (last vis-
ited Jan. 25, 2011) ("[Nlon-public information about Twitter users is not released unless we have
received a subpoena, court order, or other legal process document.").
79. Complaint, TFSC, L.L.C. v. Doe, No. 09-CV-12017, at 7-11 (E.D. Mich. May 27, 2009).
80. Even Tanner Friedman did not know exactly who hijacked its account, just that the person
used a Marx Layne computer. Moshirnia, supra note 63. The person used an anonymous e-mail
address. Id.
81. Complaint, La Russa v. Twitter, Inc., No. CGC-09-488101, at 1 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 5,
2009).
82. Phillip Matier & Andrew Ross, Air Board Shells Out $75K for Times Columnist's Speech,
S.F. CHRON., May 10, 2009, at B1 (quoting La Russa's attorney, "We tried to reach (Twitter) for
a week, and got no response").
83. Complaint, La Russa, at 1-7 (La Russa's trademark infringement claim was brought under
15 U.S.C. § 1114, his false designation of origin claim and his trademark dilution claim were
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half an hour of receiving the complaint." La Russa dismissed the
claim after Twitter removed the case to federal court,85 and no pay-
ment was made by Twitter.86 Twitter co-founder Biz Stone blogged
that La Russa's suit "was an unnecessary waste of judicial resources
bordering on frivolous."87
D. Potential Causes of Action for Username Jacking
There are various claims that a username-jacking victim can bring
against a social networking site. Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act immunizes social sites from many torts committed by
their third-party users, but it does not protect the sites from intellec-
tual property claims.88 This Section sets out potential intellectual
property claims, including cybersquatting 89 and trademark claims.90 It
then discusses the split of authority as to whether § 230 bars a right of
publicity claim.91
1. Claims Barred by § 230 of the CDA
Section 230 of the CDA states that "[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider." 92 Thus, an interactive computer service will not be deemed
a publisher or speaker of any content that third-party users post
through the service. Congress defined "interactive computer service"
brought under 15 U.S.C. § 1125, his cybersquatting claim was brought under the Anticybersquat-
ting Consumer Protection Act, and his invasion of privacy claim was brought under § 3344(a) of
the California Civil Code).
84. Matier & Ross, supra note 82.
85. See Register of Actions, SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA DOCKET DATABASE, http://
webaccess.sftc.org/scripts/magic94/Mgrqispi94.dll?APPNAME=IJS&PRGNAME=casenumber
prompt22 (last visited Jan. 25, 2011) (enter case number "CGC09488101" and see first June 5,
2009 listing).
86. Notice of Dismissal of Complaint, La Russa v. Twitter, Inc., No. 3:09-cv-02503-EMC, at 1
(N.D. Cal. June 2009), available at http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/ca/twitter0707.pdf. Natural gas
distributor Oneok, Inc. also sued Twitter in September 2009 for trademark infringement after an
anonymous user registered the Oneok handle. See Oneok Drops Trademark Lawsuit Against
Twitter, ABC NEWS.COM (Sept. 17, 2009), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Oneok-drops-trade-
mark-lawsuit-apf-919196092.html?x=0&.v=2. Oneok dropped the suit a day later when Twitter
returned the handle to Oneok. Id.
87. Biz Stone, Not Playing Ball, TWIrTER BLOG (June 6, 2009, 11:15 AM), http://blog.twitter.
com/2009/06/not-playing-ball.html.
88. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2006).
89. See infra notes 110-20 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 121-53 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 173-88 and accompanying text.
92. § 230(c)(1). The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) provides similar immunity
from copyright infringement claims. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006).
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as "any information service, system, or access software provider that
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer
server, including specifically a service or system that provides access
to the Internet." 93 Courts have interpreted this language broadly. In
the pre-Web 2.094 era, § 230 immunity was generally extended to In-
ternet Service Providers (ISPs) and Web-hosting services.95 As the
Web became more interactive, courts held that any site with third-
party interaction was an interactive computer service. 96 Social
networking sites, which thrive on third-party interaction, fall squarely
within the common law interpretation of "interactive computer ser-
vice." Thus, § 230 will protect social networking sites.
Congress passed the CDA with the goal of protecting interactive
computer services from liability for defamatory content created by
third-party users.97 Congress expressly sought to promote the growth
93. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).
94. Web 2.0 refers to the rise of Web technologies that users can interact with, like social sites.
See Li & BERNOFF, supra note 70, at 10-11 (citing Internet observer Tim O'Reilly).
95. See Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. AOL, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 984 (10th Cir. 2000) (assuming
that America Online is an interactive computer service); Zeran v. AOL, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 335
(4th Cir. 1997) (upholding § 230 immunity for AOL (an ISP)); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs.,
135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (assuming Web hosting service to be an interactive
computer service).
96. See Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666,
671 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding Craigslist immune under § 230 for defamatory user-generated con-
tent); Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, L.L.C., 521 F.3d 1157,
1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that the plaintiff did not dispute that Roommates.com, a roommate
matching site on which users create profiles, was an interactive computer service); Carafano v.
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2003) (commenting that "reviewing
courts have treated § 230(c) immunity as quite robust, adopting a relatively expansive definition
of 'interactive computer service'" while upholding immunity for a matchmaking Web site on
which users created profiles); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 846 (W.D. Tex. 2007)
(noting that the plaintiff did not contest that MySpace was an interactive service provider under
the CDA); DiMeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523, 529 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (holding that an online
message board that allowed users to post anonymous comments was an interactive computer
service); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 501 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (holding "there is no
doubt" Google is an interactive computer service because "Google either archived, cached, or
simply provided access to content that was created by a third party"); Faegre & Benson, L.L.P. v.
Purdy, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1249 (D. Minn. 2005) (holding that a site on which users could post
comments was an interactive computer service); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp.
2d 1090, 1119 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (noting that the plaintiff did not contest that Amazon, which
houses shops run by third-party vendors, qualified as an interactive computer service); Schneider
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 40-41 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001); Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91-
DF-CMC, 2006 WL 3813758, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006) (finding that Yahoo! was an interac-
tive computer service); see also Ken S. Myers, Wikimmunity: Fitting the Communications De-
cency Act to Wikipedia, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 163, 179-81 (2006) (arguing that Wikipedia is an
interactive computer service).
97. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that Congress passed the CDA
to overrule Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063-94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), which held that the owner of an online bulletin board could be liable for
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of the Internet "unfettered by State or Federal regulation."98 Requir-
ing Web sites to continually police massive volumes of potentially de-
famatory user-generated content would severely limit the Web's
potential to continually develop for society's benefit. 99 Such defama-
tion lawsuits would prevent Web companies from innovating. Courts
have since extended CDA immunity well beyond defamation to claims
like fraud, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, neg-
ligent misrepresentation, and invasion of privacy.100
The CDA carves out four exceptions to immunity for Web site oper-
ators. 101 One exception, subsection (e)(2), states that "[n]othing in
this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to
intellectual property." 102 Courts have used this language to hold that
Web site operators do not enjoy § 230 immunity for trademark claims,
which encompass cybersquatting. 03 At least two courts have used
defamatory content posted by its third-party users); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328-29, 331 (stating that
Congress enacted § 230 in response to Stratton and holding that the CDA barred a claim against
AOL for third-party defamatory material posted through AOL's services, particularly false no-
tices that Mr. Zeran had Oklahoma City bombing paraphernalia for sale).
98. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)-(2) ("It is the policy of the United States-(1) to promote the con-
tinued development of the Internet and . . . (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free
market that presently exists for the Internet ... unfettered by Federal or State regulation .... .").
99. § 230(a)(3) ("The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true
diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad ave-
nues for intellectual activity."); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 ("Congress recognized the threat that
tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium.").
100. Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[Section
230] immunity extends beyond publisher liability in defamation law to cover any claim that
would treat Lycos 'as the publisher."'); Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 726-33
(N.D. Ohio 2007) (holding that § 230 immunized SexSearch.com from breach of contract, fraud,
negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent misrepresentation, and claims under the Ohio
Consumer Sales Protection Act); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 849 (W.D. Tex.
2007) (holding that § 230 immunity applied to negligence and gross negligence claims); Noah v.
AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 539 (E.D. Va. 2003) (stating that § 230 immunity
applied to claims brought under federal civil rights law); Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. Verio,
Inc., No. 2:04-cv-462-FtM-29SPC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1424, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2006)
(extending § 230 immunity to a tortious interference with a business relationship claim); Doe v.
Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 WL 3813758, at *21 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006) (holding
that "the 230(e)(1) exception does not encompass private civil claims" including the plaintiff's
claims of negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and civil
conspiracy).
101. The four claims that do not enjoy immunity are claims that impair enforcement of (1) any
federal criminal statute, (2) "any law pertaining to intellectual property," (3) "any state law that
is consistent with this section," and (4) the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. 47
U.S.C. § 230(e)(1)-(4). However, § 230(e)(3) states that "[n]o liability may be imposed under
any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section."
102. § 230(e)(2).
103. Universal, 478 F.3d at 422-23 (stating that plaintiff's trademark dilution claim was
brought under Florida trademark law and "[c]laims based on intellectual property laws are not
subject to Section 230 immunity"); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 413
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subsection (e)(2) to hold that the CDA does not bar claims under
state intellectual property laws. 104
Section 230 immunity also does not apply to any Web site that par-
ticipates in the creation or development of the content at issue. Par-
ticipation in content development would make the site an
"information content provider." 05 Section 230 defines "information
content provider" as "any person or entity that is responsible, in
whole or in part, for the creation or development of information pro-
vided through the Internet."106 Courts have held that facilitating the
posting of user-generated material by providing fields for users to
enter content does not make a Web site an information content pro-
vider.107 Nor does deleting portions of user-generated content.108
Whether a social networking site retains § 230 immunity will depend
on the role it played in creating or developing the user-generated con-
tent at issue.109
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that the "plain language" of § 230(e)(2) does not immunize the defen-
dant from a trademark infringement claim); Ford Motor Co. v. GreatDomains.com, Inc., No. 00-
CV-71544-DT, 2001 WL 1176319, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 25, 2001) (holding that the defendant
was not immune under § 230 for potentially violating federal trademark laws).
104. See Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 703-04
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 299 (D.N.H. 2008).
Right of publicity grants a person the right to control the commercial value of his name. See,
e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1003-04 (2d Cir. 1989).
105. Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262-63 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that
§ 230 did not immunize Yahoo! from a misrepresentation claim because Yahoo! allegedly cre-
ated fake dating service profiles on their personals site that induced the plaintiff to remain a
member, thus making Yahoo! an information content provider); Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusiness-
bureau.com, L.L.C., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149 (D. Ariz. 2005) (holding that § 230 immunity
does not apply to a service provider who, in addition to posting third-party comments, created its
own defamatory comments, thus becoming an information content provider).
106. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
107. Universal, 478 F.3d at 419 (holding that Lycos did not lose § 230 immunity for facilitating
third-party postings to a message board); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124
(9th Cir. 2003) (granting § 230 immunity to a Web site on which "the selection of the content was
left exclusively to the user" even though the site provided a questionnaire for the user to fill
out); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2004) ("Al-
though Amazon may have encouraged third parties to use [its] platform and provided tools to
assist them, that does not disqualify it from immunity under § 230 because the [third-party] ven-
dor ultimately decided what information to put on its site."); Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31
P.3d 37, 38-39, 43 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that Amazon retained immunity despite pro-
viding fields for users to enter and post book reviews).
108. Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. AOL, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985-86 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding
that a site's deletion of some user-generated content to correct errors did not constitute develop-
ment or creation of the information at issue); Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711, 719-20 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (upholding § 230 immunity for an online bulletin board operator that
controlled the "content of the discussion" by posting messages of his own, commenting on
messages posted by other users, deleting messages posted by other users, and banning users who
were disruptive).
109. See infra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
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2. Cybersquatting Claims
La Russa brought a cybersquatting claim in his complaint against
Twitter.110 La Russa claimed Twitter was in "direct violation" of the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA).' 1x The ACPA
was enacted in 1999 to prevent cybersquatting, which is the "bad faith,
abusive registration and use of the distinctive trademarks of others as
Internet domain names, with the intent to profit from the goodwill
associated with those trademarks." 11 2 The Act also protects "a per-
sonal name which is protected as a mark."" 3 Congress also provided
protection against the cybersquatting of non-trademarked personal
names in the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Re-
form Act of 1999, which outlawed the "act of registering someone
else's name as a domain name for the purpose of demanding remuner-
ation from the person in exchange for the domain name." 114 The
ACPA provides for the creation of a domain name dispute resolution
procedure; the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(UDRP), created by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN), is an example of such a procedure. 15
J. Thomas McCarthy, author of the foremost treatise on trademark
and unfair competition law, summarizes the four elements of cyber-
squatting liability as
1. The defendant has registered, trafficked in or used a domain
name;
2. Which is identical to or confusingly similar to a mark owned by
the plaintiff;
110. Complaint, La Russa v. Twitter, Inc., No. CGC-09-488101, at 4 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 5,
2009). The Complaint states,
Defendant's actions . . . including its registration and use of the domain name twitter.
com/TonyLaRussa in an intentional attempt to divert the public away from Plaintiff's
authorized websites to Defendant's website, constitute a bad faith intent to profit from
and injure Plaintiff's mark, is intended to increase traffic to Defendant's site, or were
done with knowledge that injury to Plaintiff's mark was substantially certain to occur.
111. Id. at 5; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006).
112. Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 481 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Catala-
notte, 342 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2003) ("Registering a famous trademark as a domain name and
then offering it for sale to the trademark owner is exactly the wrong Congress intended to rem-
edy when it passed the ACPA.").
113. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d)(1)(A).
114. 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETIfON
§ 25:80 (4th ed. 2010) (quoting 145 CONG. REc. S14,715 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1999), which also
notes that this section is not "intended to create a right of publicity of any kind with respect to
domain names").
115. ICANN created UDRP in 1999 to govern domain name disputes. Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN, http://www.icann.orglen/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last
visited Jan. 25, 2011).
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3. The mark was distinctive at the time of the defendant's registra-
tion of the domain name; [and]
4. The defendant has committed the acts with a bad faith intent to
profit from the plaintiff's mark. 116
The interpretation of the first element is critical in username-jacking
lawsuits. For a jacking victim to succeed in his claim, a social network
username must be a "domain name."117 Element four-bad faith in-
tent to profit-may also raise questions in username-jacking suits.118
The Lanham Act provides nine factors for courts to consider in assess-
ing bad faith:
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the per-
son, if any, in the domain name;
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name
of the person ...
(III) the person's prior use ... of the domain name in connection
with the . . . offering of any goods or services;
(IV) the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark
(V) the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's
online location ...
(VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the do-
main name to the mark owner ...
(VII) the person's provision of material and misleading false con-
tact information when applying for the registration of the domain
name ...
(VIII) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple domain
names which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar
to marks of others ...
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person's do-
main name registration is or is not distinctive and famous 119
Part III.B discusses how these factors apply to username-jacking
suits.120
3. Trademark Violation Claims
Trademark violation is another potential cause of action that may
be brought in username-jacking suits. A jacking victim can bring a
variety of trademark claims, including trademark infringement,121 di-
116. MCCARTHY, supra note 114, § 25:78 (emphasis added).
117. See infra notes 203-11 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
120. See infra notes 212-43 and accompanying text.




lution,122 and false destination of origin.123 Two issues are particularly
pertinent to username-jacking suits: (1) whether the social network
used the mark in a manner likely to confuse consumers 24 and (2)
whether the network used the mark "in connection with the sale, of-
fering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services." 125
This Section also discusses the issue of contributory (secondary) liabil-
ity for social networking sites in username-jacking situations. 126
a. Likelihood of Confusion Requirement
The core element of any trademark claim is whether the unautho-
rized use of the mark is likely to cause confusion or suggest false affili-
ation or sponsorship. 127 Likelihood of confusion is a requisite of all
trademark claims, except dilution. 128 To determine the likelihood of
confusion, some federal courts have looked to several factors includ-
ing (1) the strength of the plaintiff's mark, (2) the similarity of the
marks at issue, (3) whether consumers were actually confused, (4) the
extent of potential confusion, (5) whether the defendant harbored bad
faith, and (6) the degree to which the products compete. 129 To deter-
mine the likelihood of confusion of a post-domain path130 like a
username, courts will consider whether consumers were initially con-
fused into visiting the fake page and whether the social network har-
bored bad faith. Courts will also consider whether the page was a
parody or gripe, which would not be likely to cause confusion.
To determine the likelihood of confusion in domain name cases,
some courts have applied the concept of "initial interest confusion."131
122. Dilution laws protect against impairing the distinctiveness or reputation of a famous
mark. § 1125(c).
123. False designation of origin protects a trademark owner from another's misrepresentation
of the nature of its goods or services in a way that is likely to confuse consumers as to the origin
of the goods or services. See § 1125(a).
124. Id.
125. H§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1)(A).
126. See infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
127. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
128. The standard for a dilution claim is likelihood of dilution. See § 1125(c).
129. GRAEME B. DINwOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION:
LAW AND POLICY 480-82 (2d ed. 2007). Other factors include proximity of the goods and the
likelihood that the junior mark can bridge the gap between it and the senior mark. Id.
130. A post-domain path (also called a sub-domain) is anything after the .com in a URL, like
"TonyLaRussa" in twitter.com/TonyLaRussa. 'See Interactive Prods. Corp. v. A2Z Mobile Of-
fice Solutions, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1030-31 (S.D. Ohio 2001). "Within any domain, the
domain owner may place additional sub-domains and multiple web pages . . . ." Bally Total
Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1162 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
131. See Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 315-16 (4th Cir. 2005); Brookfield Commc'ns,
Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Although ... consumers
know they are patronizing [defendant's site] rather than [plaintiffs site], there is nevertheless
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Initial interest confusion is "customer confusion that creates initial in-
terest in [a] competitor's product; although dispelled before actual
sale occurs, initial interest confusion impermissibly capitalizes on
goodwill associated with [the] owner's mark.1" 32 Some courts have
found initial interest confusion sufficient to spur trademark infringe-
ment even when the defendant's site contained a disclaimer that it was
not associated with the plaintiff's trademark.133
The initial interest confusion doctrine could be applied to
username-jacking situations. For instance, a user could search for a
celebrity on Google and initially think, based on the search result, that
a jacked social media page is the celebrity's real page. Although the
user may quickly realize the page is a fake once he visits the page, he
was still initially confused into clicking on the search result. A user
could be lured into clicking on a search listing based on the content of
that listing. The search listing contains the page's title, for example
(Sarah Palin - Facebook), the page's URL, for example
(facebook.com/sarahpalin), and a short description of the page, which
is called the "search snippet." 134 Search engines pull the search snip-
pet from the page's description meta tag.135 A description meta tag is
a piece of Web page code that can be used to provide search engines
with a description of a page.136 For instance, the description meta tag
initial interest confusion in the sense that, by . . . divert[ing] people looking for [plaintiff's mark]
to its web site, [defendant] improperly benefits from the goodwill that [plaintiff] developed in its
mark.").
132. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).
133. PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 253 (6th Cir. 2003) ("A disclaimer
disavowing affiliation with the trademark owner read by a consumer after reaching the [infring-
ing] web site comes too late. This 'initial interest confusion' is recognized as an infringement
under the Lanham Act."); OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 190
(W.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding initial interest confusion despite a disclaimer because when users seek
the plaintiff's site and arrive "instead at defendants' web site, they cannot help being confused-
even if only momentarily"); N.Y. State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis As-
socs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding initial interest confusion because
"[p]ersons using [the infringing domain] are expecting to arrive at the [plaintiff's] Web site" even
though defendant provided a disclaimer); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, No.
97 Civ. 0629 (KMW), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, at *39 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1997) (holding that
defendant's unauthorized registration of plannedparenthood.com caused "confusion among In-
ternet users and may cause Internet users who seek plaintiff's web site to expend time and en-
ergy accessing defendant's web site" even though defendant provided a disclaimer).
134. See supra note 39.
135. Meta Tags, GOOGLE WEBMAsTER CENTRAL, http://www.google.com/support/webmas
ters/bin/answer.py?answer=79812 (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
136. Id. Another kind of meta tag that has been a source of litigation is the keyword meta
tag, which contains keywords describing the site. See Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp.,
300 F.3d 808, 813 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant's use of the plaintiff's trademark in
the meta tags of the defendant's site could violate trademark law). Keyword meta tags are irrel-
evant to username-jacking suits because the tags are no longer used by major search engines to
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of Sarah Palin's Facebook page contains the text: "Welcome to the
official Facebook Page of Sarah Palin. Get exclusive content and in-
teract with Sarah Palin right from Facebook." 3 7 Google uses this ex-
act text for the search snippet.13 8 Therefore, a Web site could use an
infringing mark in a description meta tag, Google could display that
mark in the page's search snippet, and this-along with the page title
and URL-could initially confuse a searcher into clicking on the
listing.139
Other courts have rejected the initial interest confusion doctrine,
holding that it is easy for a user to leave a false site to find the real
site.1 4 0 In Lamparello v. Falwell, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit found that initial interest confusion was not suf-
ficient to prove trademark infringement unless the unauthorized site
sought to profit from the confusion. 1 4 1 The defendant in Lamparello
registered fallwell.com (a common misspelling of Reverend Jerry
Falwell's name) to criticize Falwell's stance on homosexuality.142 The
court held that despite the initial interest confusion the site created,
the registrant was not using the confusion for financial gain-he was
only parodying Falwell.143
help rank pages. See Barry Schwartz, Yahoo Search No Longer Uses Meta Keywords Tag,
SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Oct. 6, 2009, 2:15 PM), http://searchengineland.com/yahoo-search-no-
longer-uses-meta-keywords-tag-27303 (stating that Yahoo! no longer uses the keyword meta
tag, Bing does not use it, and Google never used it); Matt Cutts, Google Does Not Use the Key
Words Meta Tag in Web Ranking, GOGGLE WEBMASTER CENTRAL BLOG (Sept. 21, 2009, 10:00
AM), http://googlewebmastercentral.blogspot.com/2009/09/google-does-not-use-keywords-meta-
tag.html (noting that Google has "ignored the keywords meta tag for years" and does not use the
description meta tag in search ranking). Danny Sullivan, Death of a Meta Tag, SEARCH ENGINE
WATCH (Oct. 1, 2002), http://searchenginewatch.com/2165061 (commenting as early as 2002 that
keyword meta tags are useless to search engines).
137. See SARAH PALIN FACEBOOK, supra note 38 (view page code by clicking on "view" and
then "source" in the browser, then search for "description" to find the description meta tag).
138. See sources cited supra note 39.
139. See N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1221 n.8 (11th Cir.
2008) (finding likelihood of confusion because "[plaintiff's] trademarks appeared in the Google
search result as part of the description of [defendant's] website. . . . [Tihe meta tags caused the
search result and thus the likelihood of confusion").
140. Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 232 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that the likeli-
hood of initial interest confusion in this case was not "legally significant"); Strick Corp. v. Strick-
land, 162 F. Supp. 2d 372, 377 (E.D. Pa. 2001) ("'Internet surfers are inured to the false starts
and excursions awaiting them' and are 'unlikely to be dissuaded, or unnerved' when, after
'tak[ing] a stab at what they think is the most likely domain name for a particular web site' guess
wrong and bring up another's webpage.") (quoting Chatam Int'l, Inc. v. Bodum, Inc., 157 F.
Supp. 2d 549, 559 n.17 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (alteration in original)); Teletech Customer Care Mgmt.,
Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1414 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (finding "brief confusion" that
results in merely clicking on the wrong Web site "not cognizable under the trademark laws").
141. Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 317 (4th Cir. 2005).
142. Id. at 315.
143. Id. at 315-17.
240
"USERNAME JACKING"
Courts have also dealt with the likelihood of confusion of post-do-
main paths, which are analogous to social network usernames. A
post-domain path is the text after the .com in a URL, like "Tony-
LaRussa" in twitter.com/TonyLaRussa. 144 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated in Interactive Products Corp. v.
A2Z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc. that "[b]ecause post-domain paths
do not typically signify source, it is unlikely that the presence of an-
other's trademark in a post-domain path of a URL would ever violate
trademark law." 145 Interactive Products could pose a hurdle to a
username-jacking victim's ability to prove likelihood of confusion.
But the victim could argue that social media profiles-because of the
mass adoption of social networking-do actually "signify source" of a
celebrity or brand. 146 Thus, likelihood of confusion in username cases
will hinge on (1) whether the court subscribes to the initial interest
confusion doctrine, (2) whether the profile is a parody/gripe, and (3)
whether the court follows Interactive Products' holding that post-do-
main paths are not likely to cause confusion.
b. Commercial Use Requirement
In addition to the likelihood of confusion, a username-jacking vic-
tim will also have to prove that the infringing trademark was used
commercially. A trademark infringement claim is not actionable un-
less the unauthorized use of the mark is commercial.147 To succeed on
a trademark infringement claim, a username-jacking victim must show
144. See Interactive Prods. Corp. v. A2Z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 2d 1024,
1030-31 (S.D. Ohio 2001).
145. Interactive Prods. Corp. v. A2Z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 692, 698 (6th
Cir. 2003) (holding that there was no likelihood of confusion from defendant's use of the trade-
mark "laptraveler" in the post-domain path of the URL a2zsolutions.com/desks/floor/lap-
traveler/dkfl-it.htm). The court was also not swayed that the URL would show up in search
engine results for the keyword "laptraveler." Id. at 698. The court concluded this based on
expert testimony that "the path name does not bias a search engine." Id. at 698 n.6. While this
expert may have been correct in 2003, it is now widely agreed that keywords within a URL do
influence search rankings. Barry Schwartz, Google's Matt Cutts on Keywords in the URL,
SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Mar. 18, 2009, 9:34 AM), http://searchengineland.com/googles-matt-
cutts-on-keywords-in-the-url-16976 (quoting Google's Matt Cutts as saying it makes sense for
Web sites to have keywords in their URLs to positively impact their site's search engine rankings
for those keywords). See also Patmont Motor Werks, Inc. v. Gateway Marine, Inc., No. C 96-
2703 TEH, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20877, at *13 n.6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 1997) ("The Court is
aware that the [trademark] 'goped' appears at the secondary level in the [defendant's] website's
URL: 'www.idiosync.com/goped.' However . . . such use does not suggest [the trademark
owner's] sponsorship or endorsement, because the Go-Ped mark did not appear in the website's
'domain name."').
146. See infra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
147. MCCARTHY, supra note 114, § 25:76.
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that the social site used his mark "in connection with the sale, offering
for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services."1 48
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) explicitly states that
comparative commercial advertising, news reporting, and commentary
are noncommercial uses that are not actionable under the statute.149
Courts have also held that the use of a trademark for parody or criti-
cism is noncommercial,15 0 even if the defendant makes money from
the use.15
c. Contributory (Secondary) Trademark Infringement
Username-jacking victims may also bring claims for contributory
trademark infringement. For a social networking site to be contribu-
torily liable for a third-party user's infringement, the jacking victim
must show that the site either (1) intentionally induced the user to
infringe on a trademark or (2) continued to supply services to "one
whom it [knew] or ha[d] reason to know [was] engaging in trademark
infringement."1 52 The social networking site must have more than
"general knowledge" that its users might infringe on others' trade-
marks; the site must have "contemporary knowledge" of which spe-
cific profiles are infringing. 5 3
148. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006). Similarly, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA)
requires use "in commerce." § 1125(c)(1). Unfair competition requires use of the mark "in
connection with any goods or services." § 1125(a). False advertising requires false or misleading
use "in connection with goods or services; [iun commercial advertising or promotion." MCCAR-
THY, supra note 114, § 27:24.
149. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (identifying "parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the famous
mark" as not actionable as dilution); 141 CONG. REC. S19,310 (daily ed. Dec. 25, 1995) (state-
ment of Sen. Hatch) ("The [Trademark Dilution Bill] will not prohibit or threaten noncommer-
cial expression, such as parody, satire, editorial and other forms of expression that are not a part
of a commercial transaction.").
150. Ford Motor Co. v. 2600 Enters., 177 F. Supp. 2d 661, 664 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (finding that
the gripe domain fuckgeneralmotors.com did not harm Ford Motor's commercial success); Nor-
thland Ins. Cos. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1123 (D. Minn. 2000) (finding defendant's use
of northlandinsurance.com for commentary noncommercial).
151. Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330, 332, 338-39 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(finding that DC Comic's creation of a comic book story that parodied body building company
Atlas' ad was noncommercial free expression despite the fact that DC sold the comics); Mattel,
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1142 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (commenting that Mattel
was unlikely to succeed on a dilution claim regarding MCA's Barbie Girl song because the song
was a parody of "the 'party-girl' image that Barbie has acquired").
152. Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v.
Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982)).
153. Id. at 107.
242 [Vol. 60:223
"USERNAME JACKING"
4. Right of Publicity Claims
Another potential cause of action is a right of publicity claim. This
Section first describes the right of publicity. It then discusses a split of
authority as to whether § 230 immunizes Web site operators from
publicity claims.
a. Right of Publicity Background
Tony La Russa, who happens to hold a law degree, 154 said, "There is
a law against improperly using a person's name without authoriza-
tion." 155 That law in California, under which La Russa brought his
claim, is California Civil Code § 3344(a). Section 3344(a), California's
right of publicity statute, provides that "[a]ny person who knowingly
uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any
manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of
advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchan-
dise, goods or services, without such person's prior consent . . . shall
be liable for any damages." 156 To succeed on a right of publicity
claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) he "owns an enforceable right in
the identity," (2) the "defendant, without permission, has used some
aspect of the identity or persona in such a way that plaintiff is identifi-
able," and (3) the "[d]efendant's use is likely to cause damage to the
commercial value of that persona."157
Right of publicity is a state right recognized by roughly half the
states either in common law1 58 or by statute; at least fifteen states
have partially or completely codified the right. 159 In practice, the right
applies primarily to celebrities. 160 Unlike a noncelebrity, a celebrity's
154. Golen, supra note 53 (quoting La Russa as saying that the public perception was that he
was upset by the criticism, but that he was really only upset with the improper use of his name).
155. Id.
156. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3344(a) (West 2000); La Russa framed this claim as an invasion of
privacy claim, which alleges infringement of the right of publicity, but goes even further by
claiming emotional and reputational damage. Complaint, La Russa v. Twitter, Inc., No. CGC-
09-488101, at 6 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 5, 2009). See also 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS
oF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 3:2 (2d ed. 2009) for a discussion of the right of publicity.
157. See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 156, § 3:2.
158. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989) ("The common law right of public-
ity, where it has been recognized, grants celebrities an exclusive right to control the commercial
value of their names . . . .").
159. EDWARD H. RABIN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN PROPERTY LAW 1287 (5th ed.
2006) (citing nineteen state right of publicity statutes).
160. See Sheldon W. Halpern, Trafficking in Trademarks: Setting Boundaries for the Uneasy
Relationship Between "Property Rights" and Trademark and Publicity Rights, 58 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1013, 1032 (2009). Some jurisdictions allow noncelebrities to bring right of publicity
claims. See Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 293 (D.N.H. 2008) (the right
of publicity plaintiff claimed damage to her reputation, embarrassment, and emotional distress);
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name has "associative value," which is "the perceived ability to confer
value on that which might be associated with the celebrity." 161 Courts
and the Restatement of Unfair Competition view the right of publicity
as a property right. 162 In addition, courts have held that the right of
publicity is an intellectual property right.163
Unlike trademark infringement law, the right of publicity requires
no proof of the likelihood of consumer confusion or false belief of
association or sponsorship.164 However, the First Amendment can
trump publicity rights, when, for example, the celebrity's persona is
used in a parody.165 In terms of commercial use, the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant intended to obtain a commercial advantage
through use of his identity; actually obtaining a commercial advantage
is irrelevant. 166 Confusion as to whether the celebrity actually en-
dorses the defendant's product is not required; all that a plaintiff
needs to prove is that his name has impermissibly been associated
with the product.167
The Third Restatement of Unfair Competition states that the mea-
sure of damages for a right of publicity violation "focuses on the pecu-
niary loss to the plaintiff or the unjust pecuniary gain to the
defendant."1 68 Courts have used this standard to award publicity
plaintiffs the amount they should have been paid for the use of their
persona and the amount of damage done to the persona's endorse-
see also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?, 17
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 191, 202-03 (1983) (arguing that a universal right of publicity should be
recognized for celebrities and noncelebrities alike).
161. Halpern, supra note 160, at 1030.
162. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir.
1996) (stating that publicity rights "are a form of property protection"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. g (1995) ("The interest in the commercial value of a person's
identity is in the nature of a property right."); MCCARTHY, supra note 156, § 10:7 n.1 (listing
cases that have held right of publicity as a property right in California, Florida, Georgia, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin).
163. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, L.L.C., 488 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2007); Acme Circus Oper-
ating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir. 1983); Atl. Recording Corp. v. Project
Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp.
2d at 302.
164. MCCARTHY, supra note 156, § 3:10.
165. See, e.g., Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 962 (holding that there is a parody exception in
Oklahoma's right of publicity statute and that the defendant's "First Amendment right to free
expression outweighs [the plaintiffs] proprietary right of publicity").
166. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 370-71 (Mo. 2003) ("[T]he commercial advan-
tage element of the right of publicity focuses on the defendant's intent or purpose to obtain a
commercial benefit . . . . [I]n meeting [this] element, it is irrelevant whether defendant intended
to injure the plaintiff . .. or actually succeeded in obtaining a commercial advantage .....
167. Halpern, supra note 160, at 1035 (citing Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 967).
168. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 cmt. b (1995).
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ment value. 169 At least one state has barred celebrity publicity plain-
tiffs from recovering damages for emotional or reputational harm,170
while other states-particularly California-have allowed these
awards.171 In most states, punitive damages are awarded in publicity
cases only when there is "proof of defendant's knowing use of plain-
tiff's identity."172
b. The Right of Publicity and § 230
Whether § 230 bars a right of publicity claim depends on one's in-
terpretation of subsection (e)(2). Subsection 230(e)(2) states that
"[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit . .. any law per-
taining to intellectual property."17 3  Federal courts are split as to
whether the "any law" language in § 230 bars only federal intellectual
property claims or both federal and state intellectual property claims,
which would include the state law right of publicity.
In Perfect 10 v. CCBill, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit recognized that subsection (e)(2) limits § 230 immunity,
but noted that "the CDA does not contain an express definition of
'intellectual property.'"174 The court stated that federal intellectual
property laws were well established, but state intellectual property
laws-like publicity rights-were not uniform. 175 These laws "bear
various names, provide for varying causes of action and remedies, and
have varying purposes and policy goals." 176 Because Web site content
is viewed across state lines, "permitting the reach of any particular
state's definition of intellectual property to dictate the contours of
[§ 230] immunity would be contrary to Congress's expressed goal of
insulating the development of the Internet from the various state-law
regimes." 77 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that "intellectual property"
in subsection (e)(2) means "federal intellectual property." 7 8 This in-
169. Doe v. McFarlane, 207 S.W.3d 52, 67 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
170. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 368 (noting that the right of publicity is not meant to
protect a person's feelings).
171. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1103 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that California law
allows celebrity right of publicity plaintiffs to recover for "humiliation, embarrassment, and
mental distress" (quoting Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 &
n.11 (9th Cir. 1974))).
172. MCCARTHY, supra note 156, § 11:36.
173. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
174. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, L.L.C., 488 F.3d 1102, 1108,1118 (9th Cir. 2007) (involving the
publicity rights of perfectl0.com models who had assigned those rights to Perfect 10).
175. Id. at 1118.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1119.
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terpretation immunizes Web site operators from state law right of
publicity claims and spells doom for Ninth Circuit plaintiffs like La
Russa.179 The court also held that any state law inconsistent with
§ 230, including right of publicity laws, cannot interfere with § 230
immunity." 80
The United States District Court for the District of New Hamp-
shire, when faced with the same issue in Doe v. Friendfinder Network.,
took the opposite stance. The court held that subsection (e)(2) allows
federal and state intellectual property claims, thus allowing a right of
publicity claim against Web site operator AdultFriendFinder.com.181
The court relied on Universal Communications Systems v. Lycos,
which stated in dicta that Florida's trademark dilution statute (a state
law) was an intellectual property claim under subsection (e)(2) and
thus was not barred by § 230.182
The Friendfinder court criticized the Ninth Circuit's reading of sub-
section (e)(2), stating that subsection (e)(2) "does not suggest a limita-
tion to federal intellectual property law."183 The court cited the U.S.
Supreme Court for the rule of law that "the modifier 'any' amounts to
'expansive language [that] offers no indication whatever that Congress
intended [a] limiting construction."' 18 4 Friendfinder noted that the
Ninth Circuit ignored the fact that Congress mentions "federal" and
"state" in other parts of § 230.185 Thus, where "Congress wished to
distinguish between state and federal law in § 230, it knew how to do
so."186 The court also dismissed the Ninth Circuit's fear that allowing
state intellectual property claims to trump the CDA would "be con-
trary to Congress's expressed goal of insulating the development of
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1118.
181. Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc. 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 291-92, 299 (D.N.H. 2008) (deal-
ing with the publicity rights of a woman who was being impersonated on adultfriendfinder.com
by an unidentified third-party user who opened the account anonymously).
182. Id. at 298 (citing Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 422-23 (1st
Cir. 2007)).
183. Id. at 299.
184. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Harrison v. PPG Indus., 446 U.S. 578, 589 (1980)).
185. Id. at 300.
186. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (2006) which states, "Nothing in this section shall be
construed to impair the enforcement of [named federal criminal statutes] or any other Federal
criminal statute" and § 230 (e)(3): "Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any
State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section"). The only other court to
address this issue is the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
which used this same reasoning in Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc. in 2009 to
determine that the plaintiffs' New York state law claims of common law copyright infringement




the Internet from the various state-law regimes."187 The court stated
that the Internet remains alive and well despite what it called a "gen-
eral consensus" before Perfect 10 that the CDA did not offer immu-
nity from state intellectual property claims.' 8
Thus, while a username-jacking victim could bring defamation and
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, these claims will
likely be barred by § 230. The victim can bring a cybersquatting claim,
which will hinge on whether a username is a "domain name" as de-
fined by the ACPA. Trademark violation claims will center on (1) the
likelihood that consumers were confused by the fake profile and (2)
whether the profile constitutes commercial use. Right of publicity
claims will depend on the court's interpretation of subsection (e)(2).
III. ANALYSIS
Username-jacking victims will likely have difficulty seeking recov-
ery from the social networking sites. This Part discusses why it is un-
likely that a username-jacking victim could recover on any of the
claims set out in Part II. The first Section claims that social network-
ing sites should be immune from claims traditionally protected by
§ 230, such as defamation.18 9 The second Section argues that cyber-
squatting claims should not be actionable because usernames are not
domain names as defined by the Anticybersquatting Consumer Pro-
tection Act (ACPA).190 This Part then claims that a jacking victim
should recover for a trademark violation only when users actually be-
lieve the fake profile is the celebrity's or brand's real profile.191 It also
contends that social networking sites will not be liable for contribu-
tory trademark infringement as long as they remove infringing
usernames that they are aware of.192 Finally, this Part argues that ce-
lebrities should not recover for right of publicity claims because recov-
ery is against Congress's clear goal in passing the Communications
Decency Act (the CDA)-to promote innovation on the Internet un-
fettered by state regulation.193
187. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, L.L.C., 488 F.3d 1102, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007).
188. Friendfinder, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 301-02.
189. See infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
190. See infra notes 202-45 and accompanying text.
191. See infra notes 246-86 and accompanying text.
192. See infra notes 287-91 and accompanying text.
193. See infra notes 297-319 and accompanying text.
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A. Section 230 Immunity as Applied to Social Networking Sites
Social networking sites qualify for § 230 immunity. These sites were
built around third-party site interaction, which makes them "interac-
tive computer services" under § 230.194 Thus, social sites will be im-
mune from many of the torts of their third-party users, including
defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The only
way a social networking site could lose § 230 immunity is if the site
participated in jacking the username.195 When a user signs up for a
social networking site, the site provides a field by which the user can
choose a username. 196 Providing this field will not destroy § 230 im-
munity. In Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, the Ninth Circuit held that
even though metrosplash.com provided third parties with an online
form to enter content, "the selection of the content was left exclu-
sively to the user." 197 Deleting portions of user-generated content
also will not destroy § 230 immunity. 198 Because social networking
sites leave username selection "exclusively to the user," they should
retain § 230 immunity.
For a social networking site to lose § 230 immunity, it would likely
have to create the fake profile itself, as occurred when Yahoo! created
fake dating profiles to induce users to remain members of its online
dating service. 199 This possibility will likely be a non-issue in most
username-jacking cases. Thus, the social sites will likely retain immu-
nity for claims that fall under § 230, like defamation, intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress,200 and, in some jurisdictions, right of
publicity.201
194. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
196. See TwrrTER: CREATE AN ACCOUNT, supra note 43; FACEBOOK: CREATE A PAGE, supra
note 72.
197. See also Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007)
(finding that Lycos retained immunity despite facilitating third-party message board postings);
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.
com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2004) ("Although Amazon may have ...
provided tools to assist [third parties], that does not disqualify it from immunity under § 230
. . . ."); Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 42-43 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that
Amazon retained immunity despite providing fields for third parties to enter book reviews).
198. See Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. AOL, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985-86 (10th Cir. 2000) (hold-
ing that the site's deletion of some user-generated content to correct errors did not constitute
development or creation of the information at issue); Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711, 719-20
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (upholding § 230 immunity for an online bulletin board opera-
tor that controlled the "content of the discussion" by posting messages of his own, commenting
on messages posted by other users, deleting messages posted by other users, and banning users
who were disruptive).
199. See Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262-63 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
200. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 173-88 and accompanying text.
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B. Likelihood of Recovery: Cybersquatting
A username-jacking victim will also likely not succeed in a cyber-
squatting claim because (1) the ACPA only protects domain names,
not usernames, and (2) the social networks do not act with bad faith
intent to profit in username-jacking situations.2 0 2 The ACPA protects
against cybersquatting-the bad faith registration of another's trade-
mark as a domain name and the offering for sale of that name to the
trademark owner.203 Usernames, which appear in the post-domain
path of a URL, are not domain names under the ACPA; they are post-
domain paths within the twitter.com or facebook.com domain name.
Courts have stated that post-domain paths are not domain names-
albeit before the ACPA's enactment. 204 The ACPA defines "domain
name" narrowly as "any alphanumeric designation which is registered
with or assigned by any domain name registrar, domain name registry,
or other domain name registration authority as part of an electronic
address on the Internet." 205 This definition, according to Congress,
was meant to exclude "screen names, file names, and other identifiers
not assigned by a domain name registrar or registry." 206 Therefore, the
jacking victim will have to show that the social site is a domain name
registrar to prove that a social username is a domain name.
The ACPA does not define "domain name registrar." 207 However,
ICANN defines "registrar" as "the entity with which the Respondent
has registered a domain name." 208 Courts have confirmed this defini-
tion.20 9 ICANN maintains a list of accredited and operational regis-
202. To sue the social networking site, a username-jacking victim would have to prove that the
social site-not the individual jacker-acted with bad faith intent to profit.
203. See Ford Motor Co. v. Catalanotte, 342 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2003).
204. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1165 (C.D. Cal. 1998)
(holding that the defendant "[did] not use Bally in his domain name" in the URL compupix.
com/ballysucks because Bally was only mentioned in the post-URL path); Patmont Motor
Werks, Inc. v. Gateway Marine, Inc., No. C 96-2703 TEH, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20877, at *13
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 1997) (finding, regarding the URL www.idiosync.com/goped, that the Go-
Ped trademark appeared in a post-domain path and "did not appear in the website's 'domain
name"').
205. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (emphasis added).
206. 145 CONG. REc. S14,715 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1999) (emphasis added); see also Bally, 29 F.
Supp. 2d at 1162 n.1 (stating "[d]omain names are licensed to individuals by Network Solutions,
Inc." (a registrar)).
207. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127.
208. Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN, http://www.
icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
209. Weber-Stephen Prods. Co. v. Armitage Hardware & Bldg. Supply, Inc., No. 00 C 1738,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6335, at *4 n.1 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2000) ("The term 'registrar' refers to the
entity (such as Network Solutions, Inc. or America Online) through which a company or individ-
ual can register a domain name.").
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trars, which does not include any of the social networking sites. 210
Thus, social networking sites are not domain name registrars who as-
sign domain names.
Even if a social networking site was considered a domain name reg-
istrar, courts have held that registrars do not violate the ACPA be-
cause they do not "traffic in" domain names as required by
§ 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii). 211 A registrar does not traffic in a domain name
because it assigns the domain name to a third party, which then traf-
fics in the name. Therefore, to prove that a social media username is a
domain name, the jacking victim will have to make the difficult show-
ing that (1) the social networking site was a domain name registrar
that assigned the username as a domain name to a third party, and (2)
the social networking site itself continued to traffic in the domain
name after assigning it to the third party.
In addition to proving that a username is a domain name, the jack-
ing victim would also have to prove that the social network acted with
bad faith intent to profit from the victim's name. Cybersquatting
often entails an attempt to sell a domain name to the trademark
holder.2 1 2 The difference between cybersquatting and username jack-
ing is that a user never owns a social network username, he just con-
trols it. Thus, the user does not have the right to sell the name. The
social networking site owns the username and can take it back at any
time, for any reason. 213 Social networking sites prohibit the selling or
transferring of usernames. 2 14  They also have trademark violation
complaint processes to ensure that authorized parties control trade-
marked usernames.215 These safeguards make it difficult for a
210. See Accredited Registrars, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/registrars/accredited-list.html
(last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
211. See, e.g., Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 881 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a domain name
registrar, as well as a second site that offered the domain name for auction, did not traffic in the
allegedly infringing domain name and were therefore not liable under the ACPA). The ACPA
states that "'traffics in' refers to transactions that include, but are not limited to, sales, purchases,
loans, pledges, licenses, exchanges of currency, and any other transfer for consideration or re-
ceipt in exchange for consideration." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(E). Domain name registrars are
also not liable for monetary relief to a trademark holder as long as they do not refuse to remove
or transfer the infringing domain. § 1114(2)(D)(i)(I).
212. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Catalanotte, 342 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2003).
213. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
214. Id.
215. See Trademark Policy, TwITTER SuPoRT, http://help.twitter.com/forums/26257/entries/
18367 (last visited Jan. 25, 2011); Copyright Policy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/legal
copyright.php?noncopyright-notice=1 (last visited Jan. 25, 2011) (intellectual property infringe-
ment automated form); What Is a Trademark?, MYSPACE, http://faq.myspace.com/app/answers/
detail/a_id/749/kw/trademark/r id/100061 (last visited Jan. 25, 2011) (encouraging trademark
owners to first attempt to resolve a dispute with the allegedly infringing user and, if that does not
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username-jacking victim to make the required showing that the social
networking site acted "with bad faith intent to profit from the plain-
tiff's mark." 216
The ACPA provides nine factors for courts to use in evaluating bad
faith in cybersquatting cases.217 An evaluation of these factors dem-
onstrates that a court would not likely find that a social networking
site acted in bad faith in a username-jacking situation. The first factor
is "the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if
any, in the domain name." 218 This factor recognizes "that there may
be concurring uses of the same name that are noninfringing, such as
the use of the 'Delta' mark for both air travel and sink faucets." 219 A
social networking site would not be acting in bad faith if it assigned a
username to a user who could be a bona fide owner of that name. The
second factor-"the extent to which the domain name consists of the
legal name of the person" 220-accounts for situations where two or
more users have the same legal name.221 A social networking site
would not be acting in bad faith if it assigned a username to someone
with a legal right to that name-like the non-Senator John McCain on
LinkedIn.222
The third factor-"the person's prior use ... of the domain name in
connection with the . . . offering of any goods or services" 223-is not
applicable to username-jacking situations. The fourth factor is "the
person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site
accessible under the domain name." 224 Congress meant this fourth
factor to "balance the interests of trademark owners with the interests
of those who would make lawful noncommercial or fair uses of others'
marks online, such as comparative advertising, comment, criticism,
parody, news reporting, etc." 225 The majority of username-jacking in-
cidents involve criticism or parody.226 Courts have rejected ACPA
work, to contact MySpace); Copyright Policy, LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/static?key=
copyright-policy&trk=hbftjcopy (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
216. MCCARTHY, supra note 114, § 25:78.
217. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
218. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I) (2006).
219. 145 CONG. REc. S14,713 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1999).
220. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(II).
221. See HQM, Ltd. v. Hatfield, 71 F. Supp. 2d 500, 502, 506 (D. Md. 1999) (dismissing plain-
tiff's cybersquatting claim against a defendant named William Hatfield who registered hatfield.
corn where plaintiff owned "Hatfield" trademark for meat products).
222. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
223. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(III).
224. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV).
225. 145 CONG. REC. S14,713 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1999).
226. See supra notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
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claims where domain names were used for gripe and parody sites. 2 2 7
Thus, social networking sites are not acting in bad faith when they
allow gripe/parody profiles.
The fifth factor takes into account the potential cybersquatter's "in-
tent to divert consumers from the mark owner's online location." 228
ACPA liability has been triggered for domain names registered with
intent to divert traffic from competitors, capitalize on brand name rec-
ognition, and divert traffic to a parody. 229 In People for Ethical Treat-
ment of Animals v. Doughney, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held that the defendant's registration of peta.org as
a parody diverted people looking for PETA's real site because users
"who mistakenly access the [parody site] may fail to continue to
search for [PETA's] own home page due to anger, frustration, or the
belief that plaintiff's home page does not exist." 230 Fake profiles can
rank highly in the search engine results.231 But it is wrong to think, as
the PETA court did, that Web searchers will just give up searching
when they mistakenly access a site. Searchers will simply go back to
the search results page and find the real site.23 2 Therefore, fake social
227. See Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359 F.3d 806, 811 (6th Cir. 2004) (re-
jecting Lucas Nursery's ACPA claim against the plaintiff, who registered lucasnursery.com and
used it solely to gripe about Lucas); TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433, 438 (5th Cir. 2004)
(finding no ACPA violation for registration of defendant's trademark "TrendMaker Homes" as a
domain name used to complain about the plaintiff, despite that the site also contained an area
where people could recommend contractors); Mayflower Transit, L.L.C. v. Prince, 314 F. Supp.
2d 362, 369 (D.N.J. 2004) ("Defendant's 'cyber-griping' is a far cry from the 'squatting' activity
made illegal by the ACPA.").
228. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V).
229. Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 784 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding ACPA liability when
defendant registered domain names including drinkcoke.org and mymcdonalds.com with intent
to capitalize on the famous marks to divert users to anti-abortion content); PETA v. Doughney,
263 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2001); Advanced Magazine Publishers, Inc. v. Vogue Int'l, 123 F.
Supp. 2d 790, 800 (D.N.J. 2000) (inferring intent to divert based on plaintiff's statement that his
registration of vogue-international.com made people think it was "an off-shoot of Vogue maga-
zine"); Morrison & Foerster, L.L.P. v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1133 (D. Colo. 2000) (finding
ACPA liability for registering plaintiff's law firm's domain name with the intent to divert people
looking for lawyers to the site to distribute his message criticizing lawyers); DaVinci Tech. Corp.
v. Rubino, No. Civ. 05-1561, 2005 WL 1249462, at *8 (D.N.J. May 25, 2005) (finding intent to
divert customers from plaintiffs site to infringing domain registered by defendant); Mattel, Inc.
v. Internet Dimensions Inc., No. 99 Civ. 10066(HB), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9747, at *15
(S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2000) ("The diversion of internet users to a site presenting pornographic
images [barbiesplaypen.com], if viewed by a consumer hoping to view information about one of
Mattel's products, may well tarnish the image of Mattel's BARBIE products in the minds of
those consumers.").
230. PETA, 263 F.3d at 365.
231. For instance, Stephen Colbert's fake Twitter profile ranks number five for a "Stephen
Colbert" Google search. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
232. In the Colbert example, Colbert's native site, www.colbertnation.com, ranks number one
for a "Stephen Colbert" Google search. GOOGLE SEARCH RESULTS FOR STEPHEN COLBERT,
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profiles are not likely to divert traffic from the celebrity's or brand
owner's native site. As stated in Chatam International v. Bodum, "In-
ternet surfers are inured to the false starts and excursions awaiting
them."233 They are "unlikely to be dissuaded[ ] or unnerved" when
they mistakenly pull up the wrong Web page. 234
The sixth factor- "the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise
assign the domain name to the mark owner or any third party for fi-
nancial gain" 235-falls in favor of the social networking site because
the networks expressly ban the selling of usernames.236 An individual
user could sell a username without the knowledge of the social
networking site,237 but the site would not be responsible because it
would not be involved.
The seventh factor is "the person's provision of material and mis-
leading false contact information when applying for the registration of
the domain name . . . or the person's prior conduct indicating a pat-
tern of such conduct." 238 This factor does not apply to social network-
ing sites because the sites do not "apply [ ] for the registration" 2 39 of
usernames. They merely assign usernames upon user request.240 This
statutory language adds to the overwhelming amount of evidence that
usernames are not domain names under the ACPA.
The eighth factor is "the person's registration or acquisition of mul-
tiple domain names which the person knows are identical or confus-
ingly similar to marks of others." 241 "This factor recognizes the
increasingly common cybersquatting practice known as 'warehousing,'
in which a cybersquatter registers multiple domain names." 242 Twitter
guards against username "warehousing" by monitoring "the number
of accounts created" by a single user.243 Twitter also removes ac-
counts that are inactive for more than six months to prevent users
from registering a name just to hold onto it until someone offers to
www.google.com (last visited Jan. 25, 2011) (search for "Stephen Colbert"). Searchers can easily
go back and find Colbert's real site if they happen to land on his fake Twitter page.
233. Chatam Int'l, Inc. v. Bodum, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 549, 559 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
234. Id.
235. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VI) (2006).
236. See supra note 65.
237. A user could provide his log-in information to a buyer to give the buyer control over a
profile.
238. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VII).
239. Id.
240. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
241. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VIII).
242. 145 CONG. REC. S14,714 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1999).
243. The Twitter Rules, TwrrER SUPPORT, http://help.twitter.com/forums/26257/entries/18311
(last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
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purchase it.244 Policies like these suggest that a social networking site
is not likely acting in bad faith regarding this factor.
The ninth factor-"the extent to which the mark incorporated in
the person's domain name registration is or is not distinctive and fa-
mous" 2 4 5-will take into account the brand's or celebrity's fame and is
not particularly relevant to most jacking situations. Most jacked
usernames will be at least famous enough for someone to want to jack
them. All these factors indicate that a court will probably find that
most social networking sites are not acting with bad faith intent to
profit from the jacking of brand or celebrity usernames. This result-
along with the fact that usernames are not likely domain names under
the ACPA-shows that a jacking victim probably will not recover
against a social networking site for cybersquatting.
C. Likelihood of Recovery: Trademark Violations
Another potential cause of action is a trademark violation. In these
cases, a plaintiff must show (1) likelihood of confusion and (2) com-
mercial use. This Section sets out and analyzes the factors that should
be considered in determining likelihood of confusion and commercial
use in username-jacking cases. It also evaluates whether a social
networking site could be liable for contributory infringement.
1. Likelihood of Confusion Requirement
In any username-jacking situation, whether the jacked profile con-
fused users will be the central point of analysis. In analyzing the like-
lihood of confusion, jacked username situations fall into three
categories: (1) instances in which the profile is obviously fake and a
reasonable person could not be confused, as in fake Tony La Russa on
Twitter,246 (2) instances in which a reasonable person could think the
profile is real and actually be confused, as in fake Governor Palin on
Facebook, 247 and (3) instances in which the user comes across a fake
profile through a search engine, clicks because he is initially confused,
and then quickly realizes the profile is a fake. 248 Likelihood of confu-
sion should only be found in the second category, where there could
be actual confusion.
244. Id.
245. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IX).
246. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 132-43 and accompanying text.
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a. Determining the Likelihood of Confusion
Whether likelihood of confusion exists depends on the content of
the individual page. This must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.
For instance, a username-jacking victim should not recover when
there is no confusion, as in gripe and parody cases. McCarthy states
that gripe sites are a "vehicle for the exercise of free speech protected
by the First Amendment, which can trump trademark law." 249 The
parody or gripe must be clear to a reasonable person. Clarity can be
achieved by labeling the profile. For example, La Russa's fake profile
says, "Parodies are fun for everyone." 250 Clarity can also be achieved
through the profile's name or URL, such as twitter.com/ThriftyCar-
Sucks or twitter.com/McdonaldsSucks. Clarity can also be achieved
by the profile's content, based on the principle from Lamparello that
no user would ever believe Reverend Falwell, the plaintiff, would
sponsor a site criticizing himself.251 The number of fans or followers a
profile has should also be considered in deciding if users were actually
confused, but it should not be outcome determinative. For instance, it
is plausible to argue that because the fake Governor Palin had 600
Facebook friends, users were confused. But, the obviously fake Gary
Busey Twitter page has 58,000 followers not because users are con-
fused, but because they find fake Gary Busey amusing.252 Messages
between the fans and the fake profile creator should also be consid-
ered. The fact that fake Governor Palin's friends sent her earnest
messages could indicate confusion.2 53 Thus, courts should look to the
content of the jacked profile to determine the likelihood of confusion.
If a third party squats on a username without creating any content
on the profile, users are not likely to be confused. A blank profile
does not give the user sufficient evidence to make a decision as to
whether the profile is real. Because the likelihood of confusion
should be based on the profile's content, confusion cannot be gauged
unless the profile has content.
A username-jacking victim should recover when there is actual con-
fusion-despite the Interactive Products line of cases. These cases
hold that it is unlikely that an infringing trademark in a URL's post-
249. MCCARTHY, supra note 114, § 25:76.
250. Complaint, La Russa v. Twitter, Inc., No. CGC-09-488101, at Exhibit A (Cal. Super. Ct.
June 5, 2009).
251. Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 315 (4th Cir. 2005).
252. See NOT GARY BUSEY (GARYJBUSEY) ON TWIFER, http://twitter.com/GaryJBusey (last
visited Jan. 25, 2011). The page is obviously a parody because it is named "Not Gary Busey."
253. Rosman, supra note 2.
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domain path could cause confusion, 254 and they rest on the assertion
that "post-domain paths do not typically signify source" of a trade-
mark.255 It is easy to see that a user would not confuse the URL
a2zsolutions.com/desks/floor/laptraveler/dkfl-it.htm as the "lap-
traveler" trademark's actual source. 256 The a2zsolutions.com/desks/
floor/laptraveler/dkfl-it.htm URL clearly indicates that a2zsolutions-
not laptraveler-controls the domain. But due to the massive celeb-
rity and brand adoption of social networking, a user could reasonably
think that a URL like twitter.com/TonyLaRussa is controlled by La
Russa; the URL signifies the source of La Russa. Consumers expect
brands and celebrities to be present on the social networks and thus
can be actually confused by a post-domain path (username). 257
Social networks realize that profiles which intend to confuse or mis-
lead could give rise to liability. Twitter's impersonation policy, for ex-
ample, ensures that users know that a permissible parody must be
clear: "Accounts with the clear intent to confuse or mislead may be
permanently suspended." 258 However, some profiles apparently in-
tended to mislead remain active.259 Such profiles are likely to confuse
users and should provide a basis for liability for a trademark violation.
b. Initial Interest Confusion
Initial interest confusion should have no bearing in username-jack-
ing situations, despite the fact that some courts have found trademark
infringement when users were initially confused into visiting an in-
fringing Web page. 260 Initial interest confusion is "the confusion that
creates initial interest in [a] competitor's product; although dispelled
254. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
255. Interactive Prods. Corp. v. A2Z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 692, 698 (6th
Cir. 2003).
256. Id. at n.7.
257. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
258. Impersonation Policy, TwITTER SUPPORT, http://help.twitter.com/forums/26257/entries/
18366, (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
259. For example, live fake profile twitter.com/StephenColbert does not indicate that it is a
parody and even attempts to mislead users into thinking it is the real Colbert profile. STEPHEN
COLBERT ON TwITER, supra note 41 (containing the tweet directed at Colbert's real profile,
"Which is the real me? (I think it's me)"); see also STEPHEN T. COLBERT ON TWITTER, http://
twitter.com/stephencolbert_ (last visited Jan. 25, 2011) (containing the bio "That's right, I'm the
REAL Stephen Colbert" even though the profile is fake); STEPHEN COLBERT ON TWITTER,
http://twitter.com/stephentcolbert (last visited Jan. 25, 2011) (giving no indication that the profile
is fake and spamming 96,000 followers with links to deals for products ranging from eyewear to
car insurance).
260. See Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th Cir.
1999); Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629 (KMW), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3338, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1997).
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before actual sale occurs, initial interest confusion impermissibly capi-
talizes on goodwill associated with [the] owner's mark."261 The "com-
petitor's product" in a username-jacking case is the fake profile; it is
competing on the search results page with the brand or celebrity's na-
tive site or real social profile. Courts are split as to whether initial
interest confusion spurs trademark infringement in domain name
cases. 262 The doctrine is "sporadically applied." 263 Initial interest on
the Web is quickly dispelled by clicking the "back" button. Such con-
fusion is too fleeting to have any bearing and should not be legally
significant in username cases.264 Thus, a username-jacking victim
should not recover when users are initially confused.
The initial interest confusion doctrine should have no place in do-
main name trademark suits. The court in Planned Parenthood Federa-
tion of America v. Bucci found initial interest confusion from the
defendant's unauthorized registration of plannedparenthood.com be-
cause "Internet users who seek [the] plaintiff's Web site [may] expend
time and energy accessing defendant's Web site." 265 This holding is
faulty because the mere seconds it takes a user to enter "plan-
nedparenthood.com" into a browser is not sufficient "time and en-
ergy" to be legally cognizable. Planned Parenthood and other domain
name initial interest confusion cases should not be followed in
username cases. For instance, suppose a celebrity's Facebook profile
has been jacked. A searcher goes to Google, searches for that celeb-
rity, and is given search results containing the celebrity's native site
and the celebrity's fake Facebook profile. The Facebook result may
spark the searcher's interest because it is titled "[Celebrity's Name] -
Facebook," has description text from the page's meta description
which includes the celebrity's name, and displays the URL
"facebook.com/[celebrity's name]." The searcher clicks on the listing
and quickly realizes the profile is a parody, goes back to the search
results, and clicks on the native site result. This user hardly expends
any time and energy. Even if it takes the user a few minutes to realize
the profile is fake, the time and energy spent by the user is still mini-
mal. If the user is looking for the celebrity's real Facebook page and
comes across a fake page-either by searching on Facebook, directly
navigating to what they think could be the celebrity's Facebook URL,
261. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006).
262. See supra notes 133-43 and accompanying text.
263. Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 315 (4th Cir. 2005).
264. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
265. Planned Parenthood. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, at *39.
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or using a search engine-the user can also quickly go back and find
the real profile.266
Lamparello noted that courts have only applied the initial interest
confusion doctrine when the defendant attempts to use the plaintiff's
mark for financial gain.2 67 It will be difficult to show that a social
networking site attempted to use a trademark holder's mark for finan-
cial gain. This is because the social site would not be trying to sell the
username to the trademark holder. The site is not likely competing
with the trademark holder to sell similar goods or services. The site
will remove an infringing profile in good faith upon request. 268 And if
the profile is a gripe or parody, it is noncommercial and the social site
is not liable, even if the site is running advertising on the profile.269
Thus, initial interest confusion should not be used to determine the
likelihood of confusion in username cases. The likelihood of confu-
sion should be based solely on the content of the profile, taking into
account all indicators of parody or gripe. If a page clearly intends to
confuse, likelihood of confusion could be found. The social network-
ing site could then be liable for a trademark violation.
2. Commercial Use Requirement
In addition to proving the likelihood of confusion, a username-jack-
ing victim will also have to prove commercial use to recover for a
trademark violation. Similar to likelihood of confusion, a finding of
commercial use will depend on the content of the jacked profile. If
the profile is not a parody or gripe page, the jacking victim will proba-
bly be able to prove commercial use by showing that the social
networking site contained a commercial aspect, such as advertising.
266. This is assuming the brand or celebrity has a real profile. If they do not, the fake profile
cannot compete with a nonexistent profile.
267. Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 317 (citing PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d
243, 253 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding initial interest confusion where defendant attempted to use the
strength of the "Peterbilt" and "Kenworth" marks to drive business to his truck locator ser-
vice)); Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812-13 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding
possible initial interest confusion where the plaintiff and defendant were competitors and the
defendant used the plaintiff's mark in its meta tags to attempt to drive business away from the
plaintiff); Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1056 (9th Cir.
1999) (finding initial interest confusion where plaintiff and defendant were competitors).
268. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
269. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 907 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding noncom-
mercial use of the Barbie trademark where MCA sold the recording of a song parodying
Barbie); Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330, 338-39 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)




Facebook, MySpace, and LinkedIn contain advertising on profile
pages and are therefore commercial. 270 Twitter began running adver-
tising in April 2010 on internal search results pages; 2 7 1 but, as of Au-
gust 2010, it is not running ads on profile pages. Twitter does have
licensing deals in place with Google and Microsoft's Bing that allow
the engines to feed tweets into their search results pages. 272 Reports
say that the Bing deal involved a several million dollar payment to
Twitter, as well as ad revenue sharing.273 Thus, a Twitterjacking victim
could argue that Twitter sold fake tweets under his name to Google
and Bing. Additionally, as more celebrities and brands-real or
fake-open Twitter profiles, more consumers use Twitter to see what
these celebrities and brands are saying, thereby increasing Twitter's
commercial value. 2 7 4 In this way, a Twitter profile page may have a
commercial aspect sufficient to spur a trademark violation.
If the profile is a parody, gripe page, or contains political speech,
the use will likely be deemed noncommercial. 275 There is a line of
domain name parody and gripe cases finding commercial use that
should not be followed in username situations. For instance, the
PETA court held that the defendant's registration of peta.org consti-
tuted commercial use because the site linked to more than thirty com-
mercial operations that sold goods and services, and the defendant
told PETA to "make him an offer" for the domain name.2 7 6 Commer-
cial use was found even though the site was a clear parody on PETA:
"People Eating Tasty Animals." 277 PETA is an outlier and is distin-
270. Facebook serves image and text-based ads on profile pages. See Advertising, FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/advertising/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2011). Advertisers pay on a cost-per-
click (CPC) basis or on CPM (cost per every thousand times the ad is served). Id. MySpace
serves CPC and CPM banner ads on profile pages. MYSPACE ADVERTISING, https://adver-
tise.myspace.com/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2011); see also Advertising and Marketing Solutions,
LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/static?key=advertising-info (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
271. See Biz Stone, Hello World, TwiTER BLOG (Apr. 13, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://blog.
twitter.com/2010/04/hello-world.html. In June 2010, Twitter also started testing ads called
"Promoted Trends" on users' homepages-not their profile pages. See TwITTER HELP CENTER,
http://support.twitter.com/groups/35-business/topics/127-promoted-products/articles/142101-pro
moted-tweets-amp-promoted-trends (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
272. Jason Kincaid, That Didn't Take Long: Twitter Search Is Coming to Google, TECH
CRUNCH (Oct. 21, 2009), http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/10/21/that-didnt-take-long-twitter-is-
coming-to-googlel; Joseph Tartakoff, Confirmed: Microsoft Reaches Deal to Bring Twitter and
Facebook Data to Bing, PAIDCONTENT.ORG (Oct. 21, 2009, 3:02 PM), http://paidcontent.org/
article/419-microsoft-to-bring-twitter-and-facebook-updates-to-bing/.
273. Kincaid, supra note 272.
274. See generally Jessica E. Vascellaro & Michael Corkery, Twitter's Value Is Set at $1 Billion,
WSJ.com (Sept. 28, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125382643140938735.html.
275. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
276. PETA v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 366, 368 (4th Cir. 2001).
277. Id. at 366, 362.
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guishable from username-jacking cases because the PETA defendant
offered to sell the domain name to PETA.2 7 8 A social networking site
would not likely offer to sell a jacked username to a trademark holder.
Thus, even though parody or gripe social media pages have a commer-
cial aspect, these pages should be deemed noncommercial because the
social site is not attempting to sell the username.
Planned Parenthood279 and Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky280 are other
gripe/parody cases where the court found commercial use. These
cases should not be followed in username-jacking situations. The
Planned Parenthood court stated that the defendant's use of plan-
nedparenthood.com was commercial because the defendant's actions
were "designed to, and do, harm [the] plaintiff commercially." 2 8 1 The
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey came to a similar
holding in Jews for Jesus.282 Commercial use constituting infringe-
ment was found in both Planned Parenthood and Jews for Jesus
merely because the defendants registered domain names intended to
intercept the plaintiffs' audiences. 283 Despite these holdings, the re-
gistration of a domain name should not alone constitute commercial
use. Other courts have been critical of the Planned Parenthood and
Jews for Jesus cases. The Ford Motor Co. v. 2600 Enterprises court
stated that if the "'commercial use' requirement is to have any mean-
ing, it cannot be interpreted so broadly as to include any use that
might disparage or otherwise commercially harm the mark owner." 284
The Ford court also declared that "the 'in connection with goods or
services' requirement is not satisfied simply because a prospective
user of the Internet may face some difficulty in finding the home page
278. Id. at 368.
279. Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629 (KMW), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3338, at *5-7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997).
280. Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 308 (D.N.J. 1998).
281. Planned Parenthood, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338 (KMW), at *5-7 (finding defendant's
use competitive because "defendant's appropriation not only provides Internet users with com-
peting and directly opposing information, but also prevents those users from reaching plaintiff
and its services and message. In that way, defendant's use is classically competitive.").
282. See Jews for Jesus, 993 F. Supp. at 308 ("The conduct of the Defendant also constitutes a
commercial use of the Mark ... because [the use] is designed to harm the Plaintiff Organization
commercially by disparaging it and preventing [it] from exploiting the Mark .... ); but see Ford
Motor Co. v. 2600 Enters., 177 F. Supp. 2d 661, 664 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (rejecting Ford's claim
that defendant's registration of fuckgeneralmotors.com constituted dilution-related commercial
use in the sense that it disparaged and prevented Ford from fully exploiting its mark).
283. Jews for Jesus, 993 F. Supp. at 308 (finding infringement because defendant religious
activist created "a bogus 'Jews for Jesus' site intended to intercept, through the use of deceit and
trickery, the audience sought by the Plaintiff"); Planned Parenthood, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3338, at *9 (finding infringement because defendant religious activist intended to intercept
Planned Parenthood's audience and expose them to a right to life message).
284. Ford Motor Co.. 177 F. Supp. 2d at 665.
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he is seeking." 285 McCarthy states that "neither merely reserving a
domain name nor use of a domain name solely to indicate a site on the
Internet, in and of itself, constitutes 'goods or services' in the Lanham
Act sense. Rather, one must consider the content of the site identified
by the domain name." 286
Courts evaluating username jacking should take a stance similar to
that of the Ford court and McCarthy and look to the content of the
profile in question. If the page is a parody or gripe-or if there is no
content at all because the third party is merely squatting on the
name-there should be no commercial use. If the profile's content
suggests the intent to confuse consumers-and thus possibly compete
with the celebrity's or brand's native site or real social media profile-
a court should find commercial use.
3. Contributory Trademark Infringement
In addition to suing for direct infringement, username-jacking vic-
tims may also sue for contributory trademark infringement. A jacking
victim will not likely be able to prove contributory infringement un-
less the social networking site fails to remove an infringing profile
upon receiving notice that the profile is infringing.
As long as the social networking sites remove profiles that they
know are infringing, they will not be contributorily liable for their
users' infringements. Tiffany v. eBay held that for a service provider
to be contributorily liable, it must have more than "general knowl-
edge" that its service can be used for infringement. 287 The Tiffany
court found eBay not contributorily liable for third-party users selling
counterfeit Tiffany goods because eBay removed the listings in ques-
tion when it discovered they were counterfeit.288 eBay gained knowl-
edge of the counterfeit listings through its own monitoring practices,
buyer complaints, and complaints from Tiffany.289 Thus-as long as
eBay removed the counterfeit listings upon gaining specific knowl-
edge that they were counterfeit-it was not contributorily liable for
having general knowledge that its site could be used to sell counterfeit
goods.290 Social networking sites have general knowledge that users
285. Id. See also Strick Corp. v. Strickland, 162 F. Supp. 2d 372, 379 (E.D. Pa. 2001) ("Any
inconvenience to an Internet user searching for plaintiff's web site is trivial. Searches for plain-
tiff's web page on popular internet search engines, including google.con ... list Plaintiff's web
site as their first or second 'hits.'").
286. MCCARTHY, supra note 114, § 25:76.
287. Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010).
288. Id. at 109.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 107.
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can jack others' usernames. But, per Tiffany, they can only be con-
tributorily liable if they do not remove infringing usernames that they
have specific knowledge of. As long as a social networking site does
not intentionally shield itself from learning about infringing
usernames 291 and removes infringing usernames that it is aware of, it
will not be contributorily liable.
Thus, for a jacking plaintiff to recover for a trademark violation, the
content of the jacked profile must be (1) commercial and (2) likely to
confuse users into thinking the profile is real. Because the social
networking sites strictly prohibit the creation of profiles that intend to
confuse users, there will not likely be many cases that satisfy these
requirements. Contributory infringement is also unlikely, assuming
the sites remove infringing usernames upon gaining knowledge of the
infringement.
D. Likelihood of Recovery: Right of Publicity
Username-jacking victims should also have difficulty recovering for
right of publicity violations. The state right of publicity protects a per-
son's interest in profiting from the use of his persona.292 This Section
analyzes whether § 230 of the CDA immunizes Web site operators
from right of publicity claims, in light of the federal court split on the
issue.293 It then examines additional challenges that jacking victims
will likely face in publicity actions.294
1. Federal Court Split: Which Rule Is More Consistent with the
Policy of § 230?
Courts are split on whether § 230 bars state right of publicity claims.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in Per-
fect 10 that § 230 immunizes Web site operators from right of publicity
claims. 295 The United States District Court for the District of New
Hampshire took the opposite stance in Friendfinder.296 Friendfinder
held that the word "any" in (e)(2)- "[n]othing in this section shall be
construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual prop-
erty"297-meant that § 230 did not immunize Web site operators from
any intellectual property claims-federal or state.298 But (e)(3) states
291. Id. at 109.
292. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
293. See infra notes 297-318 and accompanying text.
294. See infra notes 318-35 and accompanying text.
295. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, L.L.C., 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 2007).
296. Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 299 (D.N.H. 2008).
297. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
298. Friendfinder, 540 F. Supp. at 302.
262 [Vol. 60:223
2010] "USERNAME JACKING" 263
that "[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be
imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this sec-
tion." 299 Right of publicity laws are state laws that are "inconsistent"
with § 230. Thus, social networking sites should be immune from right
of publicity claims.
To allow a right of publicity claim against a social site would under-
mine § 230's express purpose-to promote unfettered growth and in-
novation on the Internet.30 When passing § 230, Congress could not
have imagined the benefits to society derived from the mass adoption
of social networking.301 Nevertheless, Congress paved the way for
these benefits by granting broad immunity to Web site operators.302
Social networking sites are a direct result of Congress's goal of ad-
vancing innovation on the Internet. These sites could not have
evolved without Congress's broad protection. The value of a celeb-
rity's persona deserves protection. But it does not deserve protection
to the degree that social networking sites are sued into extinction be-
cause they cannot continually police their mass volume of third-party
content.
Friendfinder stated that the Internet evolved despite a "general con-
sensus" before Perfect 10 that § 230 did not immunize Web site opera-
tors from state intellectual property claims, such as the right of
publicity.3 0 3 But Friendfinder did not offer much support for this
299. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).
300. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. Social networking sites connect people
who want to be connected, allowing for the sharing of user product reviews. See Li & Bernoff,
supra note 70, at 234-35. Social networking sites amplify consumer opinions, allowing people to
help one another discover new products. William McGeveran, Disclosure, Endorsement, and
Identity in Social Marketing, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1112-13 (noting that "[m]arkets function
better when individual consumer purchasing decisions rely on improved information, as they do
in an environment saturated with accessible and relevant peer opinions").
302. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1)-(5) lays out the five reasons for granting this immunity:
The Congress finds the following:
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer services
available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary advance in the availabil-
ity of educational and informational resources to our citizens.
(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the information that they
receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the future as technology
develops.
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diver-
sity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad
avenues for intellectual activity.
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit
of all Americans, with a minimum of governmental regulation.
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of political,
educational, cultural, and entertainment services.
303. See Friendfinder, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 301-02.
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''general consensus." The court cited only two cases to support its
contention, neither of which involved the right of publicity: (1) Uni-
versal, which stated in dicta that Florida's trademark dilution statute
was a state intellectual property claim not barred by § 230, but then
decided the dilution claim was more like a defamation claim,30 and
(2) Gucci America, Inc. v. Hall & Associates, a trademark case which
stated that subsection (e)(2) applied to both federal and state intellec-
tual property claims.305 Gucci dealt with Lanham Act claims as well
as New York common law trademark infringement and unfair compe-
tition claims. 3 0 6 The state trademark laws involved in Gucci were sim-
ilar to federal trademark laws;3 0 7 allowing liability under these laws is
less likely to be inconsistent with the purpose of § 230. Right of pub-
licity laws, on the other hand, do not have a federal counterpart; they
should be analyzed separately from state trademark laws to determine
if they are inconsistent with § 230. The question of whether § 230 bars
a right of publicity claim was not even answered until Perfect 10.308
Thus, it was impossible for a "general consensus" to have emerged.
The Friendfinder decision threatens to open the floodgates of litiga-
tion in username-jacking situations. A right of publicity claim re-
quires no showing of the likelihood of consumer confusion. 309 A
celebrity would only have to show that the social networking site used,
without permission, some aspect of his identity likely to hurt his per-
sona's commercial value.310 This includes showing that the network
used the persona for a commercial purpose.311 To show commercial
purpose, the celebrity could point to advertisements running on the
profile page or distribution deals.312 Courts have held that if the use
of a celebrity persona is deemed to be largely for commercial pur-
poses, the right of publicity outweighs the First Amendment right to
304. Id. at 298, 302 (citing Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 422-23
(1st Cir. 2007)).
305. Id. at 302 (citing Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 413 (S.D.N.Y.
2001)).
306. Gucci, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 411.
307. Id.
308. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBiIl, L.L.C., 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007).
309. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 157-67 and accompanying text. This could even extend to situations in
which the third party does not jack the celebrity's username. For instance, the third party could
be using a photo or other aspect of the celebrity's personality. See, e.g., Henley v. Dillard Dep't
Stores, 46 F. Supp. 2d 587, 591-95 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (finding that plaintiff [Eagles' singer Don
Henley] was sufficiently identified by an advertisement that said "This is Don's henley"); Hirsch
v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 137 (Wis. 1979) (finding that plaintiff was identified
by a nickname).
311. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46, 49 (1995).
312. See supra notes 270-74 and accompanying text.
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free expression through gripe or parody. 313 For instance, the court in
White v. Samsung Electronics America allowed Vanna White's right of
publicity claim against Samsung when the company used a parody
robot version of White in a television advertisement.314 The court re-
jected Samsung's First Amendment parody argument by stating that
the First Amendment does not bar all right of publicity actions against
forms of expressive activity.315 In commercial advertising, the First
Amendment will not bar a publicity claim, even if the use is a par-
ody.3 1 6 This could make it too easy for username-jacking victims to
recover in situations where the profile is a clear parody or gripe.
Courts evaluating username jacking should consider other factors-
like whether users were actually confused by the profile-before vic-
tims are allowed to recover.
Perfect 10 held that subsection (e)(2) immunized interactive com-
puter services from state intellectual property laws.3 17 The court
stated that any other reading of subsection (e)(2) would be contrary to
Congress's expressed goals in enacting the CDA. 3 18 Right of publicity
laws-whether by state common law or statute-are inconsistent with
the CDA. Even though Friendfinder's reading of subsection (e)(2) is
plausible, username-jacking courts should embrace Perfect 10 and
Congress's policy "to promote the continued development of the
Internet." 319
2. Additional Challenges for Jacking Victims
Even if a court takes the Friendfinder view and allows state right of
publicity claims, a username-jacking victim could still have difficulty
recovering. The jacking victim must prove that the social networking
site's use of his persona was "likely to cause damage to the commer-
cial value of that persona." 320 This should be determined based on the
content of the profile. For instance, if the profile is a clear parody, no
reasonable user will believe that the celebrity authorized the pro-
file.321 Thus, damage to the persona's commercial value is unlikely.
313. See Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associa-
tive Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1252 (1986) (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)).
314. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992).
315. Id. at 1401 n.3.
316. Id.
317. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, L.L.C., 488 F.3d 1102, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007).
318. Id.
319. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1) (2006).
320. See MCCARTHY, supra note 156, § 3:2.
321. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, A Perspective on Human Dignity, the First Amendment,
and the Right of Publicity, 50 B.C. L. REv. 1345, 1368-69 (2009) ("[I]t is precisely because the
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This is consistent with the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Play-
ers Ass'n. The court held that Oklahoma's right of publicity statute
contained a First Amendment parody exception.322 Right of publicity
could outweigh free expression in instances where the use of the per-
sona is deemed primarily commercial. 323 But, even though social me-
dia profiles contain advertising, they do not use the celebrity personas
in the ads, as in the Vanna White case. Thus, social media profiles are
generally not primarily commercial, and parody/gripe profiles will be
protected by the First Amendment.
Additionally, some scholars have advocated that right of publicity
actions used to protect a persona's commercial value should be
treated differently than publicity actions used to protect a person's
sense of dignity. 32 4 This has implications for § 230 immunity. For in-
stance, La Russa alleged emotional and reputational damage as part
of his right of publicity claim.3 25 Perhaps a publicity claim alleging
harm to a celebrity's personal dignity is less like an intellectual prop-
erty claim and more like a defamation claim, which is routinely barred
by § 230. The clear policy of § 230 is to disallow causes of actions
based on hurt feelings.326 It is thus consistent with § 230 to bar a right
of publicity claim that is based on emotional distress or reputational
damage. This, however, can affect monetary damages. Without dam-
ages for emotional distress, embarrassment, or bruised reputation, a
username-jacking victim would only be able to recover damages for
specific commercial loss.
Specific commercial loss could be small in username-jacking cases.
Damages for publicity violations focus on actual damage to the celeb-
rity and profit (revenue minus expenses) to the infringer from the un-
authorized use.3 2 7 Revenue to the social network from a jacked
profile is likely very low. For instance, Twitter had little to no revenue
public typically understands that such parodies are not authorized that the public is not deceived
as to the use of the persona in the parody.").
322. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 962 (10th Cir.
1996).
323. See supra notes 313-16 and accompanying text.
324. Kwall, supra note 321, at 1348-49 (citing Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of
Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 971 (1964)).
325. Complaint, La Russa v. Twitter, Inc., No. CGC-09-488101, at 6 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 5,
2009) ("Plaintiff has suffered emotional distress, damage to his reputation and general damages
in the sum to be shown according to proof.").
326. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
327. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2000) ("In establishing such profits, the injured
party or parties are required to present proof only of the gross revenue attributable to such use,
and the person who violated this section is required to prove his or her deductible expenses.").
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until April 2010, when it rolled out its first revenue model. 328
Facebook's 2009 revenues are estimated to be $700 million 329 from a
base of approximately 36 billion visits.33 0 Thus, Facebook makes
about 1.94 cents per visit.3 31 Even if each of fake Governor Palin's
600 friends visited the fake page every day for the two months it was
jacked, Facebook would only make about $700 from the page.3 3 2
Thus, even a successful publicity plaintiff may receive an award not
worth the cost of the lawsuit.
Additionally, punitive damages are available in publicity cases only
when the infringer knowingly used the persona. 333 It will be difficult
for a jacking victim to prove that the social networking site knowingly
used his persona, because the site did not actually use the persona at
all-a third party did. The lack of punitive damages-in addition to
small profits to the social network and no damages for dignity harm-
make it difficult for publicity plaintiffs in jacking suits to recover a
worthwhile amount of money. Statutory damages are low-for in-
stance, $750 in California. 334 The court will award the celebrity an
injunction, but the results of an injunction could have been achieved
simply by asking the social networking site to remove the jacked
profile.335
Username-jacking plaintiffs should have difficulty recovering from
the social sites. Section § 230 will block defamation claims. The
ACPA likely does not protect username squatting. The large majority
of cases will lack the requisite likelihood of confusion to succeed in a
trademark violation claim. Finally, courts should embrace Congress's
policy to promote Internet growth unfettered by state regulations like
328. Stone, supra note 271.
329. Eric Eldon, Facebook Revenues up to $700 Million in 2009, On Track Towards $1.1
Billion in 2010, INSIDE FACEBOOK (Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.insidefacebook.com/2010/03/02/
facebook-made-up-to-700-million-in-2009-on-track-towards-1-1-billion-in-2010/.
330. Eric Eldon, comScore-Facebook- Usage, INSIDE FACEBOOK (Jan. 2, 2010), http://www.in-
sidefacebook.com/2010/01/22/comscore-quantcast-compete-show-a-strong-december-for-face
book-traffic-in-the-us/comscore-facebook-usage/ (thirty-six billion is derived from three billion
visits per month multiplied by twelve months).
331. This number was derived from the $700 million in revenue divided by the thirty-six bil-
lion visits and assumes that each visit was equally valuable.
332. The number of visits was derived from the 600 users multiplied by the 60 days the profile
was live to get 36,000 visits. That number was then multiplied by the 1.94 cents that Facebook
receives in revenue for each visit. Facebook would be allowed to subtract its expenses for main-
taining the page, which are likely low, from the revenue number. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3344(a).
333. MCCARTHY, supra note 156, § 11:36.
334. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a).
335. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
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right of publicity laws. Even in jurisdictions that may allow a publicity
action, the legal costs may not be worth the potential damage awards.
IV. IMPACT
The large majority of username-jacking situations should be re-
solved without the involvement of the courts. This Part articulates
what username-jacking victims and social networking sites can do to
avoid unnecessary litigation.33 6 It also outlines what social networks
are doing to prevent username jacking.337
Celebrity and brand owners should first make it a priority to claim
their social media usernames before someone else does. It is their
responsibility to manage their online identities. With the massive
growth of social networking, they cannot ignore their social network
identities. If their names are jacked, they should simply contact the
social networking site to recover their names. A lawsuit or a dispute
resolution process along the lines of the UDRP33 8 is not necessary.
All that is necessary is a conversation between the jacking victim and
the social site. This Comment has shown that the majority of
username-jacking victims should not succeed in lawsuits against social
sites. Moreover, the few jacking victims that should succeed should be
awarded an injunction, which amounts to the recovery of the profile.
Monetary awards are not worth the lawsuit's cost.339 Thus, a jacking
victim can accomplish the same result-an injunction-by talking to
the social site instead of suing it.
Social sites do enough to prevent username jacking. Any further
precautions would impair their ability to quickly grow for the benefit
of the Internet and society in general. Pre-jacking precautions are dif-
ficult for social networking sites to implement because, in order to
grow their user bases, the sites must make it easy for users to sign up.
It is also impossible and burdensome to users for the social sites to
verify every user before allowing them to claim a username. Because
of the latitude that the social sites must give users in signing up and
choosing usernames, there will always be some risk of username jack-
ing despite policies that forbid users from claiming usernames that
they do not have rights to.340 The sites therefore take precautions to
336. See infra notes 338-39, 346-51 and accompanying text.
337. See infra notes 341-45 and accompanying text.
338. The UDRP governs domain name disputes and provides that the dispute "must be re-
solved by agreement, court action, or arbitration before a registrar will cancel, suspend, or trans-
fer a domain name." Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, supra note 115.
339. See supra notes 324-35 and accompanying text.




protect trademarked names once they have been jacked. For instance,
Facebook requires that a user be an official representative of the
brand or celebrity to create a page for that brand or celebrity.341 If a
user violates this rule, Facebook removes the user and the unautho-
rized page.342 Twitter also bans users who do not comply with trade-
mark and parody guidelines. 343 Twitter also uses "verified accounts,"
which indicate that Twitter has "been in contact with the person or
entity the account is representing and verified that it is approved." 344
The account then receives a "verified account" badge that informs
consumers that the brand or celebrity is really who they say they
are. 34 5 Thus, social sites are working to prevent username jacking.
But social sites cannot catch every jacking attempt. Sometimes the
sites will not know that a profile has been jacked until the jacking
victim makes the site aware. The social sites need to actively avoid
litigation by being responsive to jacking victims. For instance, La
Russa sued Twitter after trying to reach them for a week to get his
fake profile removed. 346 Twitter deleted the profile after receiving the
complaint and La Russa quickly dropped the suit. 347 La Russa's suit
was either a scare tactic to recover his profile3 48 or the only mecha-
nism he felt he had left to achieve what he wanted. Conversely,
Facebook "worked quickly to resolve the situation and was very re-
sponsive" when Sarah Palin's attorney asked them to remove Palin's
fake profile. 349 MySpace was quick to return candidate Barack
Obama's profile at the request of his campaign.350 Lawsuits were
avoided in both of these instances. A lawsuit likely could have been
avoided in La Russa's situation had Twitter been more responsive.
La Russa could have used Twitter's trademark violation complaint
process in lieu of suing.351 But celebrities and brand owners cannot be
expected to comply with a username recovery process when they do
not know how long it will take, especially when their name is being
defamed in the meantime. Twitter does not need to have a twenty-
341. FACEBOOK: CREATE A PAGE, supra note 72.
342. Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 65.
343. The Twitter Rules, supra note 65.
344. TwITTER VERIFIED Accouwr, supra note 41.
345. Id.
346. Matier & Ross, supra note 82.
347. Id.
348. Natural gas distributor Oneok may have also used its suit against Twitter as a scare tactic.
Oneok dropped the suit one day after filing when Twitter returned Oneok's handle. Oneok
Drops Trademark Lawsuit, supra note 86.
349. Rosman, supra note 2 (quoting Sarah Palin's attorney).
350. Rosmarin, supra note 44.
351. Trademark Policy, TwITER SUPPORT, supra note 215.
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four hour jacking hotline; it simply needed to return La Russa's phone
calls. Thus, celebrities, brands, and social networking sites can all bet-
ter communicate to prevent this unnecessary litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
The majority of username-jacking victims will probably not succeed
in court against the social networking sites on causes of action such as
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, cybersquat-
ting, trademark infringement, and right of publicity violations. Cyber-
squatting laws should not apply to usernames because the ACPA
covers domain names, not sub-domains like Facebook vanity URLs
and Twitter handles. Celebrities should not recover on right of public-
ity claims under § 230 because Congress passed the CDA in large part
to promote the unfettered growth of the Internet. Allowing
username-jacking publicity claims would impede the growth of social
networking, which has benefited society. The social networking sites
should also be free from contributory liability as long as they remove
infringing profiles upon gaining knowledge of the profiles. Jacking
victims should not recover for trademark violations when the profile is
clearly a gripe or parody, as this would violate First Amendment free-
dom of expression. Thus, jacking victims should only recover for
trademark violations when the jacked profile is likely to confuse users
into thinking that the profile is really controlled by the celebrity or
brand, and the social networking site does not remove the profile
upon gaining notice of its existence.
However, jacking victims can achieve the same remedy-an injunc-
tion preventing the use of the username-by working with the social
sites to reclaim jacked usernames instead of suing the sites. Social
networking sites have sufficient username dispute resolution processes
in place, and it is a waste of judicial resources for celebrities and
brands to sue for username jacking. On the other hand, social sites
need to help avoid litigation by being responsive to brands and celeb-
rities whose profiles have been jacked.
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